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Summary findings
With a policy of free entry, individuals, firms, or  sanitation, explained the technology to the community,
community groups who wish to supply power, water,  and catalyzed community action. Householders and
and  sanitation  services  can do  so with  minimal  legal  neighborhoods  funded  the construction  of household
restrictions. Free entry is the opposite of "exclusivity" or  pourflush latrines and sewerage lines.
"legal monopoly."  In Paraguay, 300 to 400 private individuals and
Free entry is allowed in most industries, but  aguateros supply good quality piped water to areas
governments usually allow only one provider of power,  unserved by the public water company. Unlike the public
water, and sanitation in any given area. This is supposed  company, the aguateros allow payment of connection
to prevent wasteful duplication and ensure a supply of  fees on installment, making it easier for low-income
essential services to poor and marginal areas.  consumers to connect.
But monopoly water and power utilities often operate  - In Yemen, small-scale electricity providers
at high cost, lack funds to invest, and provide low-  innovatively meet the rural and village demand for
quality, unreliable service. Worse, poor  and marginal  electricity that the public utility does not meet.
areas are often unserved.  These entrants seldom duplicate investments, although
When the monopoly model doesn't work, it is rime to  some government intervention to ensure interconnection
look at alternatives. Ehrhardt  and Burdon provide  could improve efficiency.  Limitations on entry may
examples of alternative solutions in developing  sometimes be justified for environmental reasons or to
countries:  promote private sector investment, but those cases are
- In Karachi, Pakistan, the Orangi Pilot Project  rare.
provides sanitation in an unplanned settlement. Roughly  Legalizing  alternative providers will allow them to
800,000 working class people lived in an area where  expand and meet new needs. Limits on their entry may
sanitary conditions were medieval and a long-hoped-for  be needed sometimes, but limits should be the exception,
sewerage system never came. Starting in 1980, a  not the rule, argue Ehrhardt and Burdon. Generally, free
charitable group developed a low-cost approach to piped  entry should be allowed in power, water, and sanitation.
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Free entry - Executive Summary
In most countries, a single firm has a legal monopoly on supply of water,
electricity and sanitation in any given area.  No one else is allowed to
supply such services.
Why do such rules exist? Do they make sense, or would it be better to allow
anyone who wished to supply these services?  These are the questions this
paper answers.
What is free entry?
Free entry means lettingF
anyone who wants to  Free entry is a situation in which individuals, firms or community groups supplyoseies  w  o  wtsto.  who wish to supply power, water, and sanitation services are allowed to,
with no  (or  minimal) legal restrictions. Free  entry  is  the  opposite of
'exclusivity'  or 'legal monopoly' in which only one firm  is allowed to
supply the service.
By 'no restrictions' on entry we do not mean 'no regulation'.  Infrastructure
providers will always have to comply with laws on investment, company
registration, planning  etc. which apply in all sectors of the economy. They
may  also have to  comply with industry specific laws, for  example on
technical standards.
Free entry in this paper means that anyone who complies with such laws is
free to supply utility services, and that any industry-specific  laws will be
fair to all firms in the industry, and not biased in favour of an existing
supplier.
Why is free entry banned?
Free entry is allowed in  For most products and services, even essential ones, competition is usually
most industries...  valued and  encouraged.  Most  neighbourhoods are  served  by  several
... but usually  competing food shops.  Fears that incumbent airlines in the US may be
Governments  only allow  crushing start-up airlines through predatory pricing have led the Department
one provider ofpower,  of Transport to take action to protect the entrants.  There are many other
water and sanitation in  examples.
any area.  In water and electricity, by contrast, Governments usually ban competition.
This is supposed to  Often, the objective is to provide service to poor and marginal groups.  A
ensure  supply to  poor  single utility is mandated to provide services to an entire area, including
and marginal  areas  poor and marginal areas which might not be able to pay the full cost of
supply.  To cover the costs of this  social service, the company needs a
secure base of more affluent customers, who can be charged more than the
cost of supply. Competition  could undermine  this.
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... and to prevent  Governments also  fear that  having multiple  providers  could resu]lt in
wasteful duplication.  wasteful duplication  of infrastructure,  or poor co-ordination of investrnents
and operations.
Water and electricity supply is often a natural monopoly.  This means a
single company should be the technically most efficient provider.  A siingle
company can reap economies of scale, and  ensure that  investmenls in
various parts  of  a  complex, wide-spread and  expensive  network  are
properly co-ordinated.
Having a single utility can also make it easier ensure that technical, safety,
quality and environmental  standards  are met; regulators need only supervise
a  single entity.  In some cases, exclusive rights are granted to proimote
private investment in the utility.
Should free entry be allowed?
In giving a single utility a legal monopoly, governments hope it will operate
and invest efficiently, cover its costs, and provide a good quality, reliable
service  to the entire area it serves, including  slums, low income areas, urban
peripheries,  etc.  Where these hopes are fulfilled, there may be little reason
to tamper with success.  This is especially so  in countries with limited
governance capacity, where  managing  change  and  competition could
introduce  real risks.
Unfortunately, in most parts of the world these hopes are not fulfilled.
Often the monopoly  Monopoly  water and power utilities often operate at high cost, lack funds to
provider does not supply  invest, and provide a low quality, unreliable service.  Worst of all, they
poor and marginal  frequently provide limited or no service to poor and marginal areas. WNhen
areas.  the monopoly  model is not working, it is time to look at alternatives.
Looking  at developing  countries where alternative solutions  have developed
gives an idea of what could be possible. Here are three examples
Alternative  providers  Orangi  Pilot  Project  - Sanitation  - Orangi  is  an  unplanned
can enter the market to  settlement  in Karachi,  Pakistan.  A population  of around  800,000
fill  the gap.  working  class  people  lived  in  an  area  with  medieval  sanitation
conditions.  Diseases  such  as  typhoid,  malaria,  diarrhoea,
dysentery  and  scabies  were  rampant.  The population  waited for
years  for  the  municipal  utility  to provide  a  subsidised  sewerage
system,  but it never came.
Starting  in 1980, a charitable group developed  a low cost approach
to piped  sanitation.  The group  explained  the  technology  to  the
community,  and  catalysed  community  action.  Householders  and
neighbourhoods  funded  and  managed  the  construction  of
household  pourflush  latrines  and  sewerage  lines.  By  1993  the
services  extended  to about half the settlement.  Householders  have
benefitedfrom  improved health and increasedproperty  values,  and
continue  to contribute  the  time  and  money  necessary  to keep  the
system working.
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Paraguay's  aguateros - water supply - There are about 300 to 400
private individuals and  firms  in Paraguay supplying good quality
piped  water to  areas not served by  the public  water company.
These range from  'mom-and-pop' operations supplying their own
neighbourhood, up to larger companies serving as many as  800
connections.
Unlike the public  company, the  aguateros  allow payment  of
connection fees  on  instalment, making it easier for  low income
consumers to connect. A UNDP-  World  Bank Water and Sanitation
Program  review  concluded  "Aguaterias  have  been  operating
successfully for  a  good  ten  years  and  quality  of  service  is
increasing as experience, competition and customer activism have
increased  over time,. 2
Yemen's  small  scale  electricity  providers  - In  the  Yemen,  the
public utility meets urban electricity demand, but does not supply
rural towns and villages.  This gap is filled  by a large number of
small-scale providers.  These range from  individual households
who generate  for  their own use and supply a few  neighbours, to
larger operators supplying up to 200 households and operating
sophisticated billing systems.  The result is that rural household
electricity use in the Yemen is remarkably high compared to other
middle  income  countries.  While  there  is  little  prospect  of
significantly improving the proportion  of  rural  grid-connected
households in the next two  decades, small scale private sector
operators  have  demonstrated  a  willingness  and  innovative
approaches  to meeting the demand.3
These examples show that where  a  monopoly supplier does not meet
people's needs, other suppliers can enter the market.  These suppliers are
generally financial viable, sustainable, and customer responsive.  They
adopt innovative technology, and  expand service to  poor and marginal
areas.  Given  a  chance, such small-scale enterprises can  evolve into
substantial providers,  and  generate  significant  welfare  gains  in  the
communities they serve.  This suggests that restricting entry into crucial
sectors such as water and electricity may impose real costs, in particular on
the poorest communities.
Entrants tend to concentrate  on unserved areas, so that in practice wasteful
duplication of investment seldom occurs.  Our analysis suggests that it is
These entrants seldom  only when there is no existing infrastructure, and the market is likely to be
duplicate investments  highly profitable, that a  race for market share can result in duplication.
These conditions exist  in  some  markets, for  example in  the  wireless
2  Solo, Tova Maria and Snell, Suzanne Water and Sanitation Services for the Urban Poor - Small Scale Providers:
Profiles and Typology  UNDP-World  Bank Water and Sanitation  Program, May 1998.
3  Republic of Yemen: Household Energy Strategy Study, Phase 1.  A Preliminary Study of Northern Governorates.
Report No. 126/91 Energy Sector  Management  Assistance  Program (ESMAP) March 1991.
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telephony  market  in many  countries.  However  they  are rare in power  and
water  supply in developing  countries.
Co-ordination  between  networks  is  a  bigger  problem.  The  low  cost
sewerage  system of Orangi  needs to connect  to the  main  municipal  sewer
lines  so that  the effluent  can be  carried  away  from  the  neighbourhood  for
...  though some  disposal.  If  an  entrepreneur  in  one  area  establishes  a  small  electricity
Government  system  which  uses  a  60Hz cycle,  and  an  entrepreneur  in  a  neighbouring
intervention  to ensure  area establishes  one running  on 50Hz,  it will be impractical  to interconnect
interconnection  is  the  two  systems  in the  future  as  they  expand,  so  future  cost  savings  and
possible  could boost  gains  from  trade  will  be  lost.  These  issues  suggest  that  there  may  be  a
efficiency.  valuable  role  for  Governments  in  setting  technical  and  interconnection
standards in some cases.
There could  be times when allowing  free entry could worsen environmental
outcomes.  For  example,  numerous  small  abstractors  could  overwhelm  a
country's  environmental  regulatory  capacity,  and  over-pump  an acquifer,
Limitations  on entry  causing  saline  intrusion.  Whether  or  not  this  is  likely  to  be  a  problem
may sometimes  be  should  be  assessed  case  by  case,  and  the  probable  scale  of  the  problem
justifiedfor  compared  to  the  environmental  and  health  benefits  which  free  entry  can
environmental  reasons  deliver by improving water and sanitation  services.
It  is also true that  sometimes  exclusivity  will  be  needed  to  attract  private
investment.  However,  generally  governments  will  be  able  to  limit  the
length  of  time  for  which  exclusivity  is given,  and  should  consider  other
options which could attract investors  without prohibiting  entry.
...  or to promote private  Experience  in many  countries,  including  in Argentina  and  Guinea  in the
sector  investment  ...  water  sectors,  shows  that  privatising  monopolies  generally  improves
efficiency,  but the  privatised  companies  still  lack  an  incentive  to  extend
...  but these cases are  cross-subsidised  service  to low income  and  peripheral  areas.  Even with a
probably  rare.  dominant private supplier, allowing free entry could be beneficial.
Conclusion
Currently,  many  developing  countries  prohibit  entry  into  water  and
Legalising  alternative  electricity  markets.  All too often,  the  monopoly  supplier  provides  a poor
providers  will allow  service, and fails to supply many low income and marginal  areas.
them to expand and  Alternatives  do  exist.  These range  from  the  very  small  scale,  like  water
meet new needs.  carriers  and  privately-operated  pay  toilets,  up  to  networks  supplying
hundreds  of customers  with  power,  water  and  sanitation  services.  These
Limits  on entry will  alternatives  are  generally  created  by entrepreneurs  or  community  groups.
sometimes  be needed,  They are usually innovative, low cost and sustainable.
but these should be
exception,  not the rule.  Given  the  valuable  services  such  entrants  can  provide,  it  is  generally
counter-productive  to  outlaw  them.  Yet  this  precisely  what  legal
Generally, free  entry  exclusivity  for a single utility does.
should be allowed in  Our conclusion  is that there should be a presumption  in favour of free entry.
power,  water and  That  is  Governments  should  generally  remove  legal  restrictions  oni the
sanitation.  establishment  of new water, sanitation  and  electricity  suppliers.  Removing
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such restrictions will make it easier for existing operations to expand, and
for new entrants  to target market niches where needs are as yet unmet.
Free entry will not always be the best policy.  In some cases the risk of
duplication,  environmental  degradation,  or discouraging private investment,
will justify  limits on  entry.  But  these  cases  are  likely to  be  rare.
Governments should allow free entry, unless there is a clear reason to limit
it.  This would be  a  reversal of  the  current policy  position in  many
countries.
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1  Introduction
The World Bank asked London Economics  to advise on the circumstances,  if any, in
which governments  should restrict entry into infrastructure  industries  that are likely to
be  natural  monopolies, such  as  piped  water  and  electricity  transmission  and
distribution. The  study  focuses on  the  water  and  electricity  industries  on  the
assumptior that water and power are the most important infrastructure services for
low income consumers in countries with poor governance. Information  and examples
from other network infrastructure  industries  are also discussed.
The study assesses the costs and  benefits of restricting entry, and draws policy
implications from  that  analysis.  We  do  not  focus  on  whether free  entry  in
infrastructure is likely to occur if allowed, nor if it will be an important factor in
infrastructure provision in  the  future.  Likewise, we  do  not  consider whether
developing  countries  with  poor  governance should  adopt  policies  to  promote
competition over a network, for example by creating power pools.
We begin by defining 'free entry' and then briefly outlining current policies towards
entry in infrastructure industries.  We show that in the majority of countries, free entry
is not permitted.
The general prohibition on free entry is out of line with recommended policy for most
other sectors of the economy. Generally, allowing competitive entry to a sector will
promote efficiency.
In Section 3 we propose a general presumption that entry to infrastructure sectors
should be freely allowed. We show why this could be expected to be beneficial, and
give examples  of where it has occurred.
In Section 4  we  go on  to  consider the problems and unintended results  which,
potentially, could follow from allowing free entry in infrastructure.  Such potential
problems could include:
*  inefficient duplication  of facilities;
*  loss of universal service;
*  difficulty in attracting  private sector investment;
*  poor co-ordination of systems, and inefficient scheduling  and routing
decisions; and
*  deterioration in environmental  quality and safety outcomes.
In each of these areas we:
*  review the problems which theory suggests could occur if free entry
were allowed;
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*  outline circumstances where the problems may be most likely to
arise, and provide practical  examples  of such problems;
*  so far as possible  we draw conclusions  as to the likely prevalence and
scale of the problems; and finally
*  review the likely effect of prohibiting free entry, taking into account
dynamic and comparative institutional  issues.
Free entry cannot be considered in isolation. It interacts strongly with other complex
systems, in particular:
*  technical standards  and the development  of integrated  systems;
*  regulation;  and
*  political dynamics.
In Section 5 we consider the implications of free entry for these associated systems.
In Section 6 discuss the likely significance of adopting a policy of free entry, and
finally, in Section 7 we summarise  our conclusions.
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2  Background:  current  policies  on  entry  into
infrastructure
2.1  Defining  'free  entry'
It  is difficult to provide a  single, comprehensive  definition of  'free entry'.  The
essential idea is that free entry with respect to a particular service refers to a situation
in which there are no legal barriers  to supplying  that service.
In practice,  there are always some legal provisions  which could be interpreted  as legal
barriers to entry. Even in the most liberal regime, entrants will often have to comply
with general legal provisions requiring, for example, registration of companies and
filing of tax returns. However minor, these could be interpreted  as barriers.
Taking this into account, a possible definition of free entry would be "a situation in
which entry into the industry in question is no more restricted than entry into other
industries, for example manufacturing and retailing."  This definition also breaks
down, for two reasons.  The first is that in countries in which entry into all industries
is restricted (for example Cuba), it would be inaccurate to say that there was free
entry in water and power simply because these were no more restricted than other
industries.
The second is that there will often be industry-specific regulations which apply to
water and power providers, but not to other industries. For example, water providers
will often have to obtain water abstraction licences.  This could be seen a barrier
which  does  not  exist  in  other  industries.  Nevertheless,  if  the  sector-specific
requirement is administered in a competitively  neutral way (for example, if anyone
can purchase abstraction licences in an auction), it would not infringe the definition of
free entry that we have in mind.
Figure  2-1  captures some of  these issues.  Its  shows a  policy  spectrum, from
prohibition on entry to complete freedom  to compete.
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Laws prevent
entry, e.g.  Licensing  with  Licensing  Mh  No licence or
entry  granting  presumption  p esumpt on  approval
entry  ~~exclusive  right  against entry  in favour of  required  to
to an  entry  enter industry
incumbent
Very  Restncted  No  Restrictions
<  1  I  I  I  \  I  f~~~~~~I 
Controls  affecting entry  Sector  spec ic
indirectly  regulation  e.g.  Ewde
- regulation  regulations  regulations
Ineffective  Effective
- competition  competition  Competition
policy  policy  Policy
In Figure 2-1, specific restrictions  on entry are shown above the  line.  The continuum
moves  from legal  exclusivity  for a single supplier, through  progressively  more liberal
licensing  regimes,  to a point  in which  there  are no  licensing  or  specific  controls  on
entry at all.
Below  the  line the  general  regulatory  environment  is shown.  The positioning  of the
various  factors  is  illustrative  only.  On  the  whole,  the  more  intrusive  the  sector
specific  technical  regulations,  the  greater  the  difficulty  of  entry.  Economy  wide
regulation  can also limit entry.  Generally the  effect will be insignificant,  but in some
cases  economy  wide  regulation  will matter  a  great  deal.  High  tariffs  on  imported
small  generators,  for  example,  could  seriously  impede  small  scale  entry  in  the
electricity  market.  Limitations  on foreign investment  may block other types of entry.
Competition  law  is also important.  Generally,  effective  competition  laws  will assist
entry by allowing  entrants  access to bottleneck  facilities,  and preventing  incumbents
from  crushing  them  through  predatory  pricing  or  other tactics.  However  there  will
also be times when competition  law deters entry.  For example,  an entrant may refuse
to  invest  in a greenfields  site if it fears  it will then  be  required  to allow  competitors
access  to  its  facilities  on  regulated  terms.  Sometimes  market  sharing  agreements
would be necessary  to reduce risk sufficiently to encourage  investment.  Competition
law may prohibit such agreements,  deterring investment.
Finally, there is the problem of finding a definition  of 'free  entry'  which  encompasses
the  experiences  of countries  in which  entry has  occurred.  This  is difficult  because
often the  law  forbids  entry  in many  sectors,  and  yet,  since the  law  is not enforced,
entry occurs.
Therefore,  in  this  report,  when  we  use  the  term  'free  entry'  in  a  theoretical  or
prospective  sense (for example  in recommending  that  a  country allow  free entry,  or
discussing  the  problems  which  could  result  if  free  entry  is  allowed)  we  mean  a
situation  in which:
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*  there are no laws preventing  entry;
*  no licensing requirement  (or a presumption  that licences  will be issued); and
*  the general regulatory and legal conditions do not make entry more difficult than
it would be in other industries in a typical liberalised  economy.
When talking about actual examples of free entry, we use a broader definition.  It
includes entry which occurs even when theoretically it is illegal, and situations in
which competing licences or authorisations  are in fact issued, even when there was
not a clear presumption that they would be.  This broader definition is necessary
because, as Table  2-1 shows, there are very few examples of  'pure'  free entry
regimes.  Nevertheless, much can be learned from the cases in which entry has
occurred, even when it is not fully legally sanctioned.
The specifics of licensing or regulations are not discussed in any detail as this is not
the focus of the paper.  In Section 5 however, we explore the implications of free
entry for regulations  to ensure technical  compatibility, interconnectability  and broader
economic  regulation of the sector.
2.2  Current  policies on entry
Many,  perhaps  most,  countries  do  not  allow  free  entry  in  the  provision  of
infrastructure facilities in the water and power sectors.  Free entry is, however,
increasingly  permitted  in  other  infrastructure  industries,  in  particular  in
telecommunications.
Table 2-1 provides examples of where various countries and sectors lie in the range
from prohibition to free entry.
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._ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.......
;,,,  ,,,,,  ,,.  ,,,,,'.''",'.'  ..  ,  '".'",  ....  s  ...  ,  '  SE~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~..  .
Policy  Prohibition or severe  Licensing with real prospect  De facto free entry**  Free Entry
restrictions  on  entry*  that entry will be permitted
Sector
ater  Buenos Aires,  Argentina  - private  Enladad  Waes (curent) - 'inset  ali  -mining investor  ins  ed  Bangkok, Thailand  -household
operator  has an exclusive  concession  appointments' allowed by regulator  own water pipeline at cost of US$25  reselling of municipal water
contract  million'  permittedv
London (eighteenth  and nineteenth
Santiago, Chile  - public sector  centuries) -the capital's water supply  Nigeria, Onitsha- thriving private  i Jakarta, Indonesia - household
company  with exclusive  franchise  was created by private companies  water trucking industryi  reselling of municipal  water
i who competed  with each other where  permitted"
Trinidad and Tobago - publicly  I networks  overlapped'  Paraguay (many private supply  l
owned, privately  managed company  companies  - 'aguaterias')"'  Guatemala City, Guatemala  - water
Kenya,  Nairobi - licensing of  l  trucking with water supplied from
}  i  competing  water kiosks"  ij  Philippines (various towns) - UV  private wellsX
disinfection based water vending
Senegal,  Dakar - private standpipe  stations operatingvii  Senegal,  Dakar - water carriers and
operators (fontaniers)"  water carters"
Sanitation  Buenos  Aires, Argentina  ! Benin Cotonou  - Private septage  Malang,  East Java, Indonesia  -i
collection by tanker, and treatment.""  small bore sanitation and treatment
system established  by private
I England and Wales (current)  - 'inset  I entrepreneur
appointments' allowed by regulator  r  P
!  !  |~~~~~~~~~  Orangi Pilot  Project, Karachi,j
Jamaica - private collection of  I Pakistan  - community  group
septage by tanker. Private piped  ii_catalysed  provision of low cost  __
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Policy  Prohibition  or severe  I Licensing with real prospect  ! De facto free entry**  Free Entry
restrictions  on  entry*  that entry will be permitted
Sector
i treatment  provided by housing  piped sanitation
I  j developers  and resortsxe
Lahore, Pakistan  - based on Orangi
Nigeria,  Agbara Industrial Estate has  Pilot Project
i a private  company treating waste for
other companies on the  estatex.v  i Trinidad - majority of sewerage
provision  is through small private
Philippines,  Dagupan  City - a public  systems installed by housing
j toilet is successfully  run as a business  developers,  septic  tanks, and private
by a private entrepreneur  j  trucking of septagexv
Electricity  Argentina  - transmission  and  UK  - Power generation, electricity  j Mali - mining investor  installed  Argentina - power generation and
distribution  retailing  own electricity  systemxv  marketing (retail supply)
Nigeria (most places)xv  Nigeria (Maroko,  Victoria Island - Yemen-  a large  number of small  i Australia - generation- no barriers to
i entry was permitted in unserved  1 operators supply  nearly all rural  I entry in Victoria, New South Wales,
area)-  V  elcctricity.xx  Queensland or South  Australiaxx`
Laos- a significant  proportion  of  Australia -retail  supply -barriers to
electricity  in rural areas is supplied  entry being removed in most statesxxI
by small generators operated  by
households  communities  or private  New Zealand""
entrepreneursxx
Other  Jamaica  - Telecoms  (Cable and  Australia  - State of Victoria  - gas  International  call back services in  Argentina  gas production and
Wireless has 25 year exclusive  retailing. Licensed entry will be  many countries  marketing (retail supply)
licence over most telephone  services,
i6Section 2  Background:  current  policies on entry into infrastructure
jabI4  perttFt*o 
A  j  ,  v  ,.  ,,  ..  j.'.AY.  ji  $  - - i  SS'  \'  )t >-; \  ,'  .- ::  ii.........e.''^..  .. V--F'Se  Entry
Policy  Prohibition  or severe  Licensing  with real prospect  De facto free entry**  Free Entry
restrictions  on entry*  that entry  will be permitted
Sector
i  with a further  right.of.renewal)xxv  permited  ntemet telephony in many countries  Australia- gas production  in 
I Victoria,  New South Walesxxx
Australia  telecommunicationsx'i
New Zealand - gas, Telecoms,  postal
I  Nigeria - postal services  (entry by  services...
DHL permitted)xxv"
Chile-gas  transmission
UK - gas retailing,
telecommunications  I Global communication  satellite
systems"'
US telecommunications  (many
segments)
US railways  in the nineteenth
centuryXXVll
*Given  the number of countries in this category,  we only list those referred to in the text
** By de facto free entry we mean that entry may not be legally permitted,  but it occurs. We include in this column cases where we know small scale entry has occurred, but we are
not sure of the legal framework. Thus it is possible  that some of the de facto free entry examples  are in fact cases of legal free entry.
Note: all references footnoted in this table are contained  in Annex 4 at the end of the paper
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As far as we are aware, most of the countries  which legally sanction free entry in their
formal water and power sectors are developed nations.  In most cases a licence is
required and free entry is restricted  to certain areas. For example:
*  most Australian States permit free entry in  electricity generation
(although licences are needed to join power pools in most States),
and are liberalising  entry in electricity retailing;
*  the  UK  allows  entry  in:  gas  (retail  and  network  extensions);
electricity (retail and new connections  but not network extensions);
and water distribution through 'inset appointments'. In all of these
cases a licence is required, but the main requirement is that basic
minimum technical standards  are met.
*  New Zealand allows entry in electricity,  gas and telecommunications.
Entrants are generally required to register with the Government, and
comply with competitively neutral regulations such as information
disclosure requirements.
Free entry was important in the development  of infrastructure  during industrialisation
in the UK and USA. For example, London's water supply system was constructed  by
a  number  of  private  companies  most  of  which  had  non-exclusive  statutory
authorisations from the Government, and competed with each other in a variety of
ways.4 Similarly  in  the  US,  early  railroad  investment often  required  legal
authorisation,  but  these  authorisations  could  be  non-exclusive, and  railroads
competed with each other. 5
Examples of less developed countries that allow free entry in formal and large scale
infrastructure provision include:
Argentina, which allows competitive entry in power generation and
in electricity and gas marketing (retail supply). The transmission and
distribution  networks are the subject of concessions,  but must provide
access to competing  producers and retailers;  and
*  Chile allows free entry into the gas transmission pipeline business,
which resulted in competition between developers - the so-called
'pipeline war' ;6
Many countries permit legal or de facto free entry into small scale and informal
provision of infrastructure-related  services.  A UNDP-World Bank study highlights
the reasons for this, and its importance;
4  Tynan and Cowen (1998).
5  Chernow, Ron (1997) p.22-2 5.;  and Wasserstein, Bruce (1998) Big Deal:  The Battle for
control ofAmerica's Leading Corporations  Warner Books Inc. p.29-35.
6  Warwick Smith,  World Bank - personal communication.
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"Municipally operated public standpipes, public toilet facilities  and public
baths are often poorly maintained  when they are not out of service entirely.
... Thus it is not surprising that the majority of marginal urban residents buy
water and sanitation services from  small private providers who do  what
public providers cannot or will not.  " (Solo  & Snell 1998 p. 1)
Services in which legal or de facto free entry is common  include:
*  self supply of water through wells and rainwater  tanks;
*  water-carrying;
*  water trucking;
*  night soil collection;
*  cesspool emptying;
*  self-supply  of back-up electricity generation;
*  messenger and courier services;  and
*  mnini-bus  services.
It  is clear however that  in the  vast majority of cases free entry  into significant
infrastructure facilities is not permitted.
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3  Presumption  in favour  of free entry
A natural monopoly can be defined as an industry  in which it is most efficient to have
a single supplier.  That is, an industry is naturally monopolistic if for all industry
outputs, the cost function is subadditive (i.e. the cost of producing the total output is
less than the sum of the costs of producing the parts).  However, the fact that an
industry is  characterised as a  natural monopoly is  not  in  itself  a  rationale for
prohibiting entry to the industry.
If it is most efficient for a single operator  to supply a service, then, in most cases any
operator entering will have higher costs than the existing operator 8 Therefore, the
entrant will not be able to compete. The single operator will remain in business, and
the entrant will fail. Free entry will result in the efficient market structure of a single
provider.
On the other hand, if the entrant succeeds in out-competing the incumbent, it will
generally show that the incumbent was not the most efficient provider.  Again, free
entry will produce the efficient result.
It could be argued that allowing competition in naturally monopolistic industries is
inherently inefficient because for the period in which the competitor tries to enter, it
will be supplying at higher than efficient cost, creating a net loss to society.  This
problem is discussed in Section  4.1. However in general, these losses will be suffered
by the business attempting entry. Business people do not usually make investments
which they expect will result in losses.
The prima facie conclusion is that free entry is unlikely to  reduce efficiency or
welfare. In sectors which are true natural monopolies,  free entry will usually have no
effect. Free entry may increase efficiency,  by allowing competition  in areas that were
considered to be natural monopolies, but in fact are not.  The competition that has
resulted  in  industries previously assumed to  be  natural monopolies is  a  strong
argument in favour of permitting  free entry.
This prima facie result is consistent with the general policy prescription in almost
every other area of the economy; that competitive  pressure  increases efficiency by:
*  reducing  monopoly  inefficiencies;
*  increasing incentives  to innovate; and
*  reducing reliance on  regulation and  government intervention and
thereby decreasing risks of costly regulatory failure.
7  Where.  y = y,  C(y) < Y C(y;).
8  The case in which part of the market can be supplied at a lower average cost than the whole
market, even with the existence  of subadditivity,  is discussed in Section 4.1.
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The following sections develop  each of these points.
3.1  Reducing  monopoly inefficiencies
The impact of competitive pressure on monopoly inefficiencies is developed in the
theory of contestable  markets. It emphasises  that in a perfectly contestable market, a
free entry policy will oblige the incumbent monopolist to operate efficiently, such
that it earns zero economic profits and consumer welfare is maximised9  This can
hold even in naturally monopolistic  industries.
Efficient behaviour results from the monopolist's strong incentive to  deter entry.
Deterring entry requires the monopolist to adopt prices and production levels such
that there are no opportunities  for entry  that appear profitable  to entrants.
The theory  of  contestable markets  shows that  for  free  entry  to  motivate  the
monopolist to operate efficiently, entry and exit must be cost-less. Exit is cost-less
where there are no sunk costs associated with entry (fixed costs do not constitute a
cost of exit and are therefore not a barrier to entry).l1  These conditions do not hold
in the case of infrastructure industries and in particular in water and electricity. The
existence of sunk costs means that a free entry policy will not in itself result inthe
incumbent monopoly operating  efficiently.
However allowing entry puts an upper bound on monopoly inefficiencies (provided
the costs of the inefficiencies are borne by consumers and not just by governments).
Examples include:
*  the threat of major customers developing alternative water supply
systems  through  desalination, to  remove  their  reliance  on  an
incumbent's network supply. For example, in Trinidad and Tobago,
major  industrial  customers  responded  to  the  poor  quality
(unreliability) of the  government-owned  utility's  water  supply by
investigating self supply through desalination.  Knowledge of this
"investigation"  provided strong incentives  for the utility to respond to
ensure adequate water supply for these customers;
*  the ability for of tourist areas to develop private sewerage systems
rather than relying on the monopolists' integrated sewerage systems
helps  put an  upper  limit on  monopoly inefficiencies.  This  is
observed in Jamaica and elsewhere  in the Caribbean; and
9  Conditions for a perfectly contestable market are that: entry is allowed and can be reversed
without cost; potential entrants serve the same demand and use the same productive techniques
as those of the incumbent firm; and potential entrants evaluate the profitability of entry at the
incumbent's pre-entry prices.
10  Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1988).  Note:  Sunk costs are costs that are incurred even if all
production ceases. They are an irrecoverable cost of entry.  Fixed costs are costs that can not
be reduced even in the long run by decreases in output, but they can be eliminated by stopping
production completely.
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*  in Nigeria, state water and power  utilities are highly unreliable. As a
result, the vast majority of manufacturing firms provide their own
infrastructure facilities, such as generators and wells.  Even though
this costs far more than relying on the state monopolies, it provides
the manufacturers with the reliability they need.  The effect of this
competition on the state utilities is not clear, but it is clear the free
entry in the form of self supply increases efficiency overall in this
situation.I  1
3.2  Incentives to innovate and use appropriate technology
The  available  empirical evidence supports the  view  that  competitive  pressures
provide a better  incentive for  innovation than an uncontested position of market
power.
There are a number of theoretical reasons why this may be so.  For example, Tirole
shows that the monopolist's incentive to innovate is less than the incentive for a
competitive firm  to  innovate.  However, where  a  monopoly  is threatened  by
competition this result is reversed because, since competition reduces profits, the
monopolist's incentive to remain a monopoly is greater than the entrant's incentive to
enter.1 2 However the theory is not unambiguous. Schumpter argued that large and
profitable corporations are more likely to advance innovation due to reasons such as
superior access to capital, and ability to pool risks. 13
Competition may also promote the use of appropriate technology.  At times the
technology and approach of the monopolist  incumbent may not meet the needs of the
local population. Thus it will often be desirable to allow entry to enable innovative
altemative sources  of supply to be put in place. For example:
e  alternative technology and solutions that reflect local physical and
economic  conditions have  been  used  by  aguateros (owners  of
individually owned piped water systems) to  develop water supply
systems in Paraguay. Since 1980 an increasing number of aguateros
have established piped systems to supply water to areas not supplied
by the public sector providers (SENASA or CORPOSANA). There
are around 300-400 aguateros, the largest of which have  around
1,200  connections; 14
*  the Orangi Pilot Project brought sanitation to an area of Karachi,
Pakistan.  Technological  innovation was a key factor in the success
of  this  project.  Where the  incumbent utility  concentrated  on
11  Lee & Anas (1992).
12  Tirole, J The Theory of Industrial Organisation pp 389-394.
13  Schumpter,  J A (1942), Capitalism,  Socialism and Democracy. New York: Harper.
14  Drangaert, Malgarejo, Kemper,  Bakalian (1997).
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conventional solutions, the project organisers developed simplified
design and construction methods.  The community could carry out
much of the construction itself, and costs were cut to a quarter of
those of a conventional  system;15  and
*  in Laos, where electricity is a leading export, rural electrification is
currently very low compared with  other Asian  countries, despite
evidence of significant demand. The geography and patterns of rural
settlement mean that conventional grid based extensions are difficult
and  not  viable.  Innovative  off-grid  systems  such  as  diesel,
microhydro and  solar generation that can be  supplied by  private
entrepreneurs  are more appropriate. At present small private off-grid
systems provide some such systems, and should be encouraged to
expand. 16
Technical innovations are often deployed by entrants, rather than incumbents.  For
example,  a  widely  acclaimed  small  scale  ultra-violet  water  purification  unit
developed in the US  in  1996 is being deployed by  small scale  entrants  in the
Philippines, South Africa and elsewhere,  not by large providers. 1 7
3.3  Regulatory  and  government  failure
Well tailored, effective interventions and regulation can in principle lead to optimal
outcomes.  However restricting entry, tailoring  interventions and  removing any
competitive  threat places  high demands on govermnent  or the regulator  to:
*  ensure customers' needs are met;
*  limit monopoly  inefficiencies; and
*  determine when entry should be allowed to occur.
The risk of regulatory failure is high.l  8 The costs of regulatory failure are high even
in developed countries such as the US and the UK, where regulatory ability is high
15  Solo & Snell (1998).
16  ESMAP 1997 Institutional  Developmentfor OFFGRID  Electrification  in Laos (Draft). UNDP
and World Bank Energy Sector  Management  Assistance  Programme. December 1997.
17  The system was developed by Dr Gadgil of the University  of California at Berkeley and won
Discover magazine's 1996 Award for Technological  Innovation  in the Environment Category,
and Popular Science  magazine's 1996  Best of What's New Award.  Solo & Snell (1998).
18  We  refer to  a  'regulator',  but  we  use the  term broadly to  encompass any  agency of
Government that tries to make a water, sanitation or power provider serve the public interest.
In other words it includes truly independent regulators of private utilities such as ETOSS the
water regulator in Buenos Aires. It  also includes other  bodies which are  charged with
regulating publicly owned utilities, such as Ministers, and Boards of Directors - where these
are given a public interest role not a purely commercial objective (as do, for example, the
Boards of State Owned Enterprises in Australia and New Zealand, which typically have a
largely commercial function and are regulated by other Government  agencies).
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(see  Section  3.4  for empirical  examples).  The risks of  costly  regulatory  failure  are
likely to  be higher  in less  developed  countries.  Therefore,  while  acknowledging  the
benefits of well  designed and appropriate  regulation, in this section  we concentrate  on
the  problems  of  regulatory  failure  in countries  with  low  governance  capacity.  We
outline  sources  of regulatory  failure,  experiences  from  developing  countries  and  the
policy  implications.
3.3.1  Sources of regulatory failure
The  demand  for  regulation  comes  from  the  fact  that  utilities  are  monopolies.
Customers  have no choice but to purchase from them.  This allows  private utilities  to
charge  well  above  cost,  which  may  be  inefficient  and  is  certainly  unpopular.
Government  utilities  are  usually  not  profit  motivated,  but  they  can  abuse  their
monopoly  position  in other  ways.  For  example,  managers  may  choose  to  have  an
easy life, rather  than working hard to improve  service and increase efficiency.
Regulators  fail  to make  utilities  act  in the  public  interest  for a  number  of  reasons.
These include:
*  lack of information;
*  lack of ability;  and
*  lack of incentives.
To regulate  effectively requires  information.  Regulators  need to know the actual  level
of a company's  costs, and whether  these costs could  be reduced.  They need to know
the true extent  and reliability of supply, and whether these could be increased through
better use of the utility's  existing resources.
The  fundamental  problem  is  information  asymmetry;  regulators  rely  for  their
information  on managers,  but managers  have the  incentive and  ability to  distort and
manipulate  the  information.  While  regulators  may  be  able  to compel  managers  to
reveal  information  on current  performance,  it is near  impossible  for regulators  to tell
by how  much performance  could be improved.
Regulating  a utility  company is a difficult task, which  can require  a level of expertise
similar to that required  to manage the  utility.  But technical,  economic,  financial  and
legal  skills  are  in  short  supply  in  most  developing  countries.  Governments  and
regulators  can  seldom  pay  enough  to  attract  skilled  people  in  this  area.  While
Ministers  or  Board  members  are  sometimes  highly  able,  they  generally  have  many
demands  on their time.  As a result, regulatory  analysis  and  decision-making  is often
poor.
The final problem  is that regulators  may not have incentives  to make utilities  further
the  public  interest.  These  perverse  incentives  can take  numerous  forms.  At  times
regulators  may just  not work hard enough to achieve all possible  gains.
More  perniciously,  regulators  may  seek to use their  powers  for personal  or  political
ends.  A  Minister  may  refuse  to  allow  tariff  increases  because  this  increases  his
popularity  in the  short term,  even though  it deprives the  utility of funds to expand  to
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cover new areas. A Board member may demand kick-backs  on major contracts, even
through this increases costs to the final consumer. 19 Even nominally 'independent'
regulators can have their own agendas and interests  to pursue.
A study of 58 countries found that, across  the economy as a whole,
corruption  and  bureaucratic  efficiency  indices  are  significantly  and
robustly  negatively  correlated  with  investment  even  controlling  for  other
determinants  of  investment,  including  the political  stability  index" and  that
"the  bureaucratic  efficiency  index  is significantly  and  robustly  associated
with low growth  ... there is evidence that institutional  inefficiency  causes low
growth"  (Mauro,  P  (1995),  Corruption  and  Growth  Quarterly  Joumnal of
Economics,  August 1995 p.681-7 12,  p.695)
The study also found a strong correlation  between the level of red tape and the level
of corruption.  It has been suggested that bureaucrats intentionally introduce new
regulations and red tape, in order to be able to extract more bribes by threatening to
deny permits. 20
Countries with the least administrative  capacity failure will typically face the greatest
risks of costly regulatory failure.
The costs can be extremely high.  For example a study of Nigerian manufacturing 21
found that firms spent well in excess of 10% of their total machinery and equipment
budget on their own generation,  water supply and other infrastructure provision. This
expenditure would have been unnecessary,  had the monopoly infrastructure providers
offered a reasonable service.  The authors noted that the public monopoly providers
"have large amounts of capital already in place but fail to deliver their service at the
level required to meet demand". They concluded  that,
"The  causes  of  [public  monopoly]  infrastructural  failure  may  be  grouped
into  two  kinds.  The first  is  relatively  well  understood  and  relates  to
shortcomings  of the technology  used by the public  sector,  including problems
in  the  day-to-day  management,  and  operation  and  maintenance  of  the
facilities.  The second  is more complex  in nature  and less well controlled,  and
relates  to  general  problems  with  administration,  bureaucracy,  planning,
metering,  billing  for  services  delivered,  revenue  collection,  personnel
training  in  the  public  sector  and  lack  of  appropriate  incentives  for
management  andpersonnel  in part  because of civil service pay  ceilings.  This
19  McCarthy, Stephen (1994) Africa: The Challenge of Transformation, St Martin's Press, New
York, New York; cited in Kerf, Michel and Smith, Warwick (1996)  Privatising Africa's
Infrastructure:  Promise and Challenge,  IBRD World Bank, Washington  Box 1-2.
20  Krueger, Anne (1993) Virtuous and  Vicious Circles in Economic Development Papers and
proceedings of the American Economics  Association LXXXIII (1993), p.35 1-56; and De Soto,
Hemando (1989) The Other Path New York, New York, Harper and Row; cited in Mauro
(1995).
21  Lee & Anas (1992).
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second  set  of ex-inefficiencies  [sic] has remained  the key problem  over the
years ... " (Lee  & Anas  (1992)  p.1072-3)
The above quote cites institutional  problems at both the management and regulatory
level as the key reason for failure of monopoly public infrastructure provision. In
short, monopoly providers of  utilities  will often have  poor  incentives to  serve
consumers. Regulation and Government  control are used to try to make utilities serve
consumers. If this worked perfectly,  there would be no need to allow free entry. But
in  practice  regulators  and  governments often  fail.  The  result  is  the  chronic
underperformance by  monopoly utilities  observed in most  developing countries
today.
3.3.2  Simple rules are often best
Consideration of the costs of Government and regulatory failure also suggests that,
especially for countries with low governance  capacity, a simple rule allowing entry in
all circumstance will be optimal even if the Government knows that there are some
cases in which it would  be optimal to limit entry?2
The argument goes as follows.  Despite the general presumption in favour of free
entry established in this section, there are times when efficiency could be increased
by limiting entry. These cases are discussed in Section  4. This is illustrated in the top
diagram in Figure 3-1.  The figure illustrates (in a purely subjective way) efficiency
outcome from three possible policy settings: exclusivity, pure free entry, or 'tailored
entry', in which the Government makes case by case decisions on the level and type
of entry to allow.
Given the presumption in favour of free entry we argue that of the two extreme
positions,  pure  free  entry  is  likely  to  be  more  beneficial  than  exclusivity.
Nevertheless, if we ignore regulatory and government  failure, tailored entry would be
better still.  The Government  would allow free entry where this increased efficiency,
thus reaping all the gains that entry has to offer, but limit and control entry in those
cases in which it could be harmful.
22  Milgrom and Roberts  (1992).
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Once regulatory and Government failure is taken into account, the picture changes.
Under tailored entry, the regulator requires a high level of skill and informnation  in
order to  make  effective interventions. Figure  3-lB  shows the  possible cost  of
complex  analysis  and  discretionary decisions  tailored  to  each  situation.  As
governments move away from simple rules of universal application, costs rise as a
result of:
*  increased costs of analysis and decision making within Government,
as each situation must be analysed  afresh;
increased costs  on the  private  sector, as  a  result  of delays and
uncertainty;  and
*  increased losses from lobbying, corruption and other rent-seeking
behaviour, as people try to manipulate the decision-making process
to their own ends.
Figure 3-lB  illustrates that the costs of regulatory failure are higher for discretionary
systems of tailored entry than  for either of the  extreme positions, which involve
simple rules.
We also  show the  costs  of regulatory failure being higher under  the  exclusive
situation than under free entry. The reason for this is that free entry allows people an
escape route from the worst effects of monopoly provision, and thus mitigates the
costs of failure.  An additional reason is that exclusivity increases the rents available
from the monopoly provider, and thus worsens harmful rent-seeking behaviour. This
point is developed in Section 5.3.1.
Figure 3-1C shows the net benefits of each policy position, based on the subjective
value assigned in the top and middle diagrams. The high costs of regulatory failure
under tailored entry outweigh possible gains from establishing an optimal policy.
Either of the extreme positions would be a better option.  Of the two extremes, free
entry is likely to have better efficiency effects, and lower costs of regulatory failure.
On these assumptions, a simple rule in favour of free entry will be the best policy,
even if free entry itself could be harmful in some cases.
Box 3-1 provides an example of a successful  reform process which relied on simple
rules to reduce the costs of discretionary decision-making.
23  Krueger, Anne (1993) Virtuous and Vicious Circles in Economic Development Papers and
proceedings of the American Economics  Association LXXXIII  (1993), P.351-56; and De Soto,
Hernando (1989) The Other Path New York, New York, Harper and Row; cited in Mauro
(1995).
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Box  3-1.-  The Value  of Simple  Rules  in New  Zealands Reforms
It  oould,  be argued  that the New Zealand  Govenmnent  adopted the approach
described  above  in that country's  extensive  economic  reform  programme  (which
commenced  in 1984).  The  refonns  relied  on relatively  few  simple  rules  of general
application, such as:
*  Allowing  entry wherever  possible;
*  Avoiding  industry  specific  regulation;  and
*  Relying  on general  competition  law to govern  interconnection  and
related  issues.
These  rules were  undoubtedly  sub-optimal  in some  instances.
However, the  approach provided reasonable clarity, certainty and consistency,
while  economising on  policy-making capacity.  This  last point  is  especiaUy
important  for small countries undertaking  many reforms at the same time, as New
Zealand  was.
3.4  Evidence from similar industries
The wisdom of allowing and promoting free entry has been demonstrated in many
industries that exhibit economies  of scale and scope, and involve network effects and
scheduling  problems. For example:
*  following  US  airline  deregulation  in  1978,  fares  have  fallen
dramatically (an estimated 29% reduction in real prices ten years
after deregulation). Other  key  service quality  indicators such as
safety  records  and  number  of  interline  changes  required  have
improved since deregulation. Some estimates show the annual value
of consumer benefits due to deregulation to be around $19 billion a
year; 2 4
*  the deregulation of the US trucking industry in 1980 brought about
immediate and  substantial falls  in  rates  (reduction in  real  fares
between 1977-1987  estimated at 28% for truck load fares and 58%
for less than truck load fares). Efficiency gains have been significant.
The annual decline in real  operating costs  between  1987-93 are
estimated to be around  9% a year; 25 and
24  Crandall and Ellig. (1997). Economic Deregulation and Customer Choice: Lessons for the
Electric Industry. The Centre  of Market Processes  Inc.
25  Crandall and Ellig. (1997).
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*  in the  New Zealand telecommunications sector, privatisation, the
removal of the incumbent's statutory monopoly, and the entry of a
new carrier into the domestic and international market has brought
about significant reductions in prices to both residential and business
customers, and  a  dramnatic  improvement in  service quality.  The
growth in productivity  of the incumbent is estimatedto have resulted
in annual average cost reductions of 5.6% in the 7 years following
privatisation. 26
The benefits of competition  in an industry are generally considered  to be so great that
private businesses with a dominant  position in a market frequently have their freedom
to use that position against competitors constrained  by law.  Good examples of such
laws include the  Fair  Competition Act  in  Jamaica, the  Trade Practices Act  in
Australia, and the competition provisions of the Treaty of Rome in the European
Union.
In considering free entry, it is worth bearing in mind the sustained efforts which
public authorities in a number of countries have made to facilitate competitive entry
in industries with similar characteristics to infrastructure industries.  High profile
examples include the:
*  the break-up of British Gas ten years after privatisation, to facilitate
competitive entry in gas retailing;
*  current US Department of Transport action designed to protect start-
up airlines from being crushed by existing carriers; and
*  the current anti-trust actions against Microsoft, which are intended  to
facilitate entry and innovation in the browser market, now a vital
piece of communication infrastructure.
That in many industries with similar characteristics to infrastructure industries, the
typical public policy position is to facilitate entry, raises serious questions about why
in infrastructure  sectors the usual policy position is to restrict or even prohibit entry.
3.5  Conclusion - presumption in favour of free entry
In conclusion free entry allows customers some escape from the inefficiencies of
monopoly providers.  Many people around the world rely on small scale alternative
providers for basic infrastructure services (even when they are technically illegally)
because the dominant utility does not provide an adequate service. The possibility of
entry can also provide some pressure  on dominant  providers  to curb inefficiencies and
increase innovation.
26  de Boles, David and Evans, Lewis (1995) The economic efficiency of telecommunications  in a
deregulated market: The case of New Zealand  Graduate School of Business Govemment and
Management  Wellington University  Working  Paper 8/95.
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The notion that regulation can force monopolies  to serve customers so well that the
free entry would not be needed is flawed.  Regulators  and governments suffer from
lack of information and ability, and may have perverse incentives. Regulation may
be necessary, but it is not sufficient. Allowing free entry provides an escape route
from regulatory failure.
The costs of regulatory failure and discretionary government decision-making are
high. This argues for simple, clear-cut  rules. The best rule will often be to allow free
entry.  Even where free entry could be harmful in some cases, a rule allowing free
entry will often be better than trying to choose case-by-case  whether entry should be
permitted.
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4  Potential  problems  associated  with  free
entry
The literature  postulates  a number of potential  problems  that  could arise if free entry
is permitted.  In this  section  we review  those  possible  problems  under the  following
headings:
*  inefficient  duplication  of facilities;
*  universal  service issues and cross subsidies;
*  exclusivity  and involving the private sector;
*  timetabling  or routing problems;  and
*  effect on compliance  with safety and environmental  standards.
In each area we outline the theoretical  problem.  We describe the conditions  in which
this  problem  is likely to arise, and  where possible,  we provide empirical  examples  of
the  problem.  We  then  discuss  the  likely  costs  of  seeking  to  resolve  the  problem
through  restrictions  on free  entry.  Where  possible  we  also  outline  measures  which
could  mitigate  the  problem  without  unduly  restricting  free  entry,  and  assess  the
effectiveness  of these measures.
4.1  Inefficient  entry and inefficient duplication
In  a  naturally  monopolistic  industry,  if free  entry  results  in inefficient  entry  or  in
inefficient  duplication  of facilities,  it could result  in a net  cost to society.  This could
occur as a result  of a:
*  strong  economies  of  scale  or  scope  across  a  subset  of  the  market,
which  we refer to as the "l/3,  2/3 problem";
*  a race for market position, which  we refer to as the "game  of chicken
problem";  or
*  two  providers  concentrating  on a  single  location  in the  market  and
ignoring  other parts, which we refer to as the "two ice-cream  sellers"
problem.
The following  sections consider each problem  in turn.
4.1.1  Inefficient entry - "the 1/3, 2/3 problem"
In most  cases a naturally  monopolistic  market will be served by one firm, even in the
absence  of  entry  restrictions.  However  where  there  are  strong  product  specific
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economies of scale or scope in a sub-set of the monopolist's outputs, a competitor
could profitably supply that sub-set of the market.  A descriptive illustration of this
case is presented in Box 4-1, which also illustrates why we call this the "1/3, 2/3
problem".
Box 4-1:  Ineffiei nt entry
Three towns desire water supplies in given quaantities.  The cost of supplying any
one of these towns by itself is $300, of supplying two of them via one facility is
$400, and of all  three towns jointly  is $660. From society's perspective it is
cheaper for any one company to supply all three towns, since $660 is less than the
cost of supply by three sepate  plants ($900),  or of supply  by any two towns by
one  plat  ithe  other  town  supplied  by a secd  plant  ($700).
If however, a monopolist supplies  all three  towns at a price  per  town of
($660!3=X$220)  an entrant  could  supply  two of the towns  more cheaply  (at-a cost
of $400/2=$200  each).
Source;  Baumol,  Panzarand  Willig  1982,  reference  to  Faulhaber  1975
Box 4-1  shows  that  free entry could result  in a  situation  in which  there  is a natural
monopoly  (in  terms  of  subadditivity  of  production  costs),  but  in which  monopoly
supply  may  be  difficult  to preserve  in the  free market  place.  This could  provide  a
rationale  for restricting  entry to natural monopolies.
This  problem  is most  acute  when the  conditions  for perfect contestability  hold  (see
Section  3.1).  As  one  moves  further  away  from  these  conditions,  the  problem
diminishes.  The greater the level  of sunk costs, and barriers to entry, and the  greater
the  incumbent's  ability to adjust prices  in response to the threat of entry,  and the less
likely this problem  is to exist.
One would not expect to encounter  this problem  often  in the  real world  of electricity
and water  supply.  Generally,  there will already  be an incumbent  supplying  the three
towns.  Water  and  electricity  supply  have  high  sunk  costs.  The  incumbent  will
generally  be  able to  drop  prices  low  enough  to make  entry uneconomic,  while  still
covering  variable  and fixed costs, and eaming  a return on non-sunk  assets.  Knowing
the  incumbent  can do this, potential  entrants will not invest.
Where  the  sunk  costs  and  lead  time  associated  with  entry  are  significant  and
competition  law  does  not prohibit  it, the  incumbent  could  also price-discriminate  to
deter entry.  The incumbent  could deter entry by dropping  its price to the two towns
where  entry is threatened  to $199.  It could then  charge the third town  $262.  In this
way it could  cover its full costs while offering  each town a better  deal than their  next
best altemative.
Of course the  entrant  could also change  its entry strategy  in response,  and target the
town  which  is now  charged  most.  Whether  changing  the  pricing  policy  will work
depends  on the response times  and the commitment  of the entrant and the incumbent.
Where  an  incumbent  is  in place,  and  the  entrant  has  yet  to  invest,  the  advantage
should  lie  with  the  incumbent.  The  entrant  will  have  a  long  lead  time  between
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starting to sink costs, and starting to supply.  Once the entrant has started to sink
costs, but before the system is complete, the incumbent could change its pricing
policy by reducing prices to the town the entrant is targeting. The entrant  would then
lose the costs it had sunk.  Seeing this threat, the entrant would be deterred from
investing.
An entrant could get around  this problem  by signing a long term contract with the 1/3
customer before sinking costs.  Then, even if the incumbent dropped prices, the
customer would be bound to the entrant. However, in this case the commercial logic
would be for the parties to reach an agreement  which does not involve any investment
by the entrant.  For example, the incumbent should be able to supply to the  1/3
customer on the same terms as provided by its long term contract with the entrant,
pay the entrant the profits the entrant would have made from its investment, and still
come out better off than if investment by the entrant proceeded. However this might
not work if several entrants threatened  - it would not be economic for the incumbent
to pay off each one.
Long term contracts can also be used to solve the problem, either by the incumbent,
or when there are no suppliers yet in place and one firm wishes to capture the entire
market. Any firm which can sign up all three towns on long term contracts will then
be protected from entry.  In practice, infrastructure investors generally ensure they
have long term contracts in place before sinking investments.  For example, the
aguateros  of  Paraguay  sign  five  year  contracts  with  their  customers  before
commencing construction. 27 Five years is the maximum length permitted by law,
suggesting that contracts  would be longer  were this permitted.
In conclusion, where there are incumbents, sunk costs, and the ability to conclude
long term contracts,  such as in water and electricity, inefficient entry as a result of the
"1/3, 2/3 problem" is unlikely, and does not provide a rationale for restricting entry.
It is possible that it could be a concem in industries such as transportation and solid
waste collection where hit-and-run entry is possible, and long term contracts are
difficult.
4.1.2  Inefficient duplication - "the game of chicken problem"
Inefficient duplication refers to  a  duplication in facilities (or  more generally  in
duplication of fixed costs)  that is at a net cost to society. This can occur as firms race
to establish market position.
In such a race, all participants continue to invest until it is clear which firm will win
the race.  At each stage, investment undertaken at an earlier point in the race can be
regarded as sunk, so the competitor will invest up to the point that the required
investment is less than the expected value of the prize.  The total investment by the
winning firm may exceed the value of the market and the resources invested by the
27  Solo & Snell (1998).
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losing firms are wasted.  In game-theoretic  terms this problem can be viewed as a
game of chicken. 28
The problem of a 'game of chicken' has been observed in infrastructure industries at
various times and locations.  For example:
*  in  the  tJS  in  the  latter  part  of  the  nineteenth  century,  rail
infrastructure  was duplicated as companies competed for dominance.
Two or more companies would compete, laying parallel routes to
serve markets which could not support the resulting capacity.  Each
company hoped that, whether through completing its line first, or a
greater  ability to withstand losses, it would remain in the market after
the others had withdrawn. Price cutting and destructive competition
resulted in losses and scores of railroad bankruptcies in the  1893
Panic; 2 9
*  it has been argued that duplication of facilities between competing
water and gas providers in London in the nineteenth century was
similarly wasteful, 30 and could be viewed as resulting from a game
of chicken.  Another view is that this apparent duplication was often
caused by  an entrant installing a  technically superior system, or
otherwise competing successfully, and therefore was  not in  fact
wasteful; 31 and
*  this year, as a result of release of new spectrum allowing increased
entry into the US wireless phone market,  towns which had previously
been served by only one or two mobile phone providers are in some
cases now served by seven or eight.  Many observers believe that the
number of providers has exceeded the equilibrium number in many
cases.  It  is likely that several of the providers will be forced to
withdraw from the market, having suffered losses and wasted their
capital.
The effect on incentives for investment, and thus on service coverage, of a chicken
situation are hard to analyse. Sometimes  to avoid a game of chicken, no one will enter
the market.32 In other cases, people will rush to invest, and as a result services will
be extended more quickly than if free entry is not permitted. If a firm had exclusivity
but no  legal requirement to  invest, the option value of waiting means that even
28  Kay, John (1993), Foundations  of Corporate  Success,  Oxford University  Press pages 46-48.
29  Chemow (1997) p.23.
30  Milward (1986).
31  Tynan & Cowen (1998).
32  See Kay, John (1993) p.115-116 for an example of this in the UK mobile phone market.
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profitable investments may be delayed. 33 (It is perhaps for this  reason that most
exclusive franchise awards contains service roll-our requirements).  Free entry may
remove the option to wait and create a rush to invest.
It  is in the interests of all firms to avoid wasteful duplication of investment.  A
number of market solutions to the problem exist. These include:
market-sharing arrangements and other agreements not to duplicate
investments. For example, in Germany,  water and gas companies are
allowed  to  enter  agreements not  to  infringe  on  each  other's
territories. 3 4 However in some countries, such agreements would be
prohibited by competition  (anti-trust) law;
*  establishing a reputation for not swerving.  This requires repeated
games, and reputation  may be costly to establish;  and
*  commitment - in the actual game of chicken, this can be done by
throwing the steering wheel out of the window.  In infrastructure
investment it could be done in a variety of ways, including by sinking
sufficient costs  early  enough, staking  something valuable  (such
reputation) on  completing the  project,  or  concluding  long  term
contracts  with purchasers.
These market solutions obviously do not always work, or we would not observe
games of chicken in business.  This raises the possibility that public policy could
improve efficiency by limiting wasteful duplication  of infrastructure investment as a
result of such games.
However regulators would face a fundamental problem of distinguishing between
races that result in duplication  which is at a net cost to society, and races that generate
benefits through competition and innovation such that there are positive net benefits
to society despite some duplication  in costs.
Furthermore, games of  chicken are not  confined to  infrastructure, but may  be
observed in many industries which yield high profits when served  by only one or two
firms, but which cannot support more than this number. Non-infrastructure  examples
include the  battle between PC (DOS and Windows) and  Macintosh formats for
personal computers, and VHS and Betamax formats for video recorders.  They may
also be observed in broadcasting in some countries, and in the civil aircraft market35
If the problem is not infrastructure specific, it suggests that public policy makers
should consider whether a  general solution is  desirable, rather than  relying on
infrastructure specific interventions  such as exclusivity.
33  Dixit, Avinash K  &  Pindyck, Robert S.  (1994) Investment under uncertainty Princeton
University Press, Princeton,  New Jersey.
34  M Klein, Competition  in Network Industries.
35  Kay, John (1993)  p. 115.
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4.1.3  Inefficient duplication - "the two ice-cream  sellers problem"
In a market which can support only two companies,  each may each have an incentive
to concentrate on the same part of the market, leaving other parts relatively poorly
served.  This is sometime referred to as the "two ice cream sellers on the beach"
problem.
While this problem may not result in unnecessary  duplication  of fixed costs, it could
be considered  wasteful duplication  in the sense  that both firms concentrate in one area
of the market while it may be socially optimal to have broader market coverage. This
is not therefore a question of whether firms should be allowed  to enter the market as a
whole, but rather a question of whether firms should be restricted in where they locate
in the market.  That is, the counterfactual in this case is whether entry should be
managed  so  that  entrants  are  forced  to  service  distinct  parts  of  the  market
(differentiated  by price, quality, or geography).
The theory starts with the observation that the optimal location for single ice-cream
seller on a beach is in the centre of the beach, since this minimises the mean distance
between the seller and his customers. 36 A second ice-cream seller then enters the
beach.  She will do best by locating right next to the first ice-cream seller.  In this
position, half the customers are closest to her, and half to the first vendor.  In any
other position, less than half the customers  would be closest to her.  Tuming now to
the first ice-cream seller, we  see he will not move, since to  do  so would mean
allowing more than half of the customers  to be closest to the second vendor. 37
In  this  problem,  customers'  convenience might  be  maximised  by  some  other
positioning of ice-cream sellers. For example,  if customers  were evenly spaced along
the beach, mean joumey times to the ice-cream seller would be minimised if one
located one quarter of the way along the beach, and the other three quarters of the
way along.  The market solution under free entry will not produce the  socially
optimal outcome relative to managed entry, in which the ice cream sellers could be
required  to service different parts of the beach.
This problem is commonly observed in the petrol station market, where often two
petrol stations will locate next to each other (where traffic is greatest) even though
motorists might find it more convenient if they were further apart.
36  Customers are assumed to be spread evenly along the beach.
37  The original paper on these issues was by Hotelling, Stability in Competition, Economic
Journal 39 (1929). Since then follow up papers have applied different models that vary certain
key assumptions, for example Hotelling's assumption of linear transport costs.  Overall it is
difficult to  draw firm conclusions about market equilibrium given different numbers of
entrants from the theoretical literature.  For example under certain assumptions (quadratic
transport costs and Bertrand price competition) the ice cream sellers will locate at the two
extremes of the beach to limit the degree of price competition. Clearly in this case duplication
does not arise and there would not be any justification for managing entry.  We acknowledge
the  inconclusiveness of the  literature but  discuss this example  because co-location (as
illustrated in the two icecream sellers example) may be posed as a reason for managing entry
into a market rather than permitting free entry.
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In liberalised transport markets, such problems are also quite commonly observed.
For example, when the New Zealand government  allowed entry into the domestic air
services market, the entrant (Ansett) and incumbent (Air New Zealand) scheduled
services 10 minutes  apart from each other, even though consumers might  have
preferred more even spacing  of flights and hence  more choice of flight times.
We are  not aware of  such problems in piped water and electricity.  The most
important  reason for this is that water and electricity can generally only support one
provider in any area. However, even if a market could support  two providers of piped
water or electricity, we would not expect the two ice-cream sellers problem. This is
because the ice-cream sellers problem only likely to exist when:
*  there  is  a  dimension of the  product which  can take  a  range of
different values (this could be location, or quality where increases in
quality require increases  in price);
*  producers can choose where along this dimension to  locate (e.g.
centre of beach or end, low quality and low price, or medium quality
and medium price); and
*  customers are evenly distributed in their preference for  different
values of the variable in question, and will purchase the product
which is closest to their preference.
In piped water and electricity there is generally no choice over location; it must be
supplied to the customer's house.  Nor will there be much scope to differentiate on
quality if, as is often assumed, customers are very concerned that service meet a
specified  minimum standard,  and are generally satisfied  once that minimum is met.
That said, it is conceivable that this problem could exist in water and  electricity
supply.  For  example, customers might have  a  range  of  preferences on  some
dimension such as reliability of water supply.  Those with a  sunk investment in
storage tanks, for example, might not mind intermittent supply, while others would
want continuous supply.  It could be that the socially efficient result would be for
there to be one cheap unreliable water utility, and another expensive reliable utility.
It could also be that free entry would result in two competing utilities of middling
reliability and price.
Such problems seem very unlikely in practice. In fact, of the few examples of which
we are aware of places which are supplied by more than one water network, the
networks are  differentiated by  the quality of the water they  supply.  Examples
include:
*  Hong-Kong  also has dual water systems. One supplies potable water,
the other non-potable  water for toilet flushing3 8
38  OECD Pricing of Water Services (1987).
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*  a water co-operative in Guatemala  City operates  two networks, a new
one and an old one.  The old network supplies customers with water
twice a week for a period of two hours each time.  The new one
supplies water for two hours every day.  The tariff differs according
to which system  a customer is connected  to; and 39
*  in London at  the end of the  eighteenth century and  start of  the
nineteenth, many households had more than one company offering
them piped water delivery, and some had as many as five.  New
entrants, such as the New River Company, offered superior service
and better quality water than incumbents such as the London Bridge
Waterworks,  in some cases forcing  them out of business. 40
In these cases, duplication may have occurred, but the choice of product quality
suggests that it was not wasteful.
4.1.4  Policy implications
In summary,  it is unlikely that inefficient entry and duplication  will occur where there
is  an incumbent and  high  sunk costs, as in the  water and power  sectors. It  is
theoretically possible that where there are strong economies of scale across a segment
of the market, free entry could result in inefficient entry, but this is very unlikely in
practice.
Inefficient entry and duplication in electricity and water could occur if there was no
incumbent, and two or more entrants invested to supply a market which could not
support all of them.
The benefits of apparently duplicative entry also need to be considered.  In a world
where regulation is perfect, duplication in any industry with fixed costs would be
inefficient.  In the absence of perfect regulation, the benefits of competitive pressure
in terms of dynamic efficiency and innovation mean that duplication may not be at a
net cost to  society.  The 'process  of creative destruction' which  drives dynamic
efficiency  and  technological  innovation  requires  duplication  to  allow  for
experimentation, and replacement of outmoded technologies.  This  suggests that
market entry which results in higher industry wide production costs in the short term
may not be inefficient over the long  term.
Investment that appears to be duplicative may reflect innovation and technological
change, or have other benefits. For example:
*  the apparent duplication  of water and gas networks in London in the
nineteenth century  allowed companies with better  technology to
displace incumbents;
39  Solo & Snell (1998). It is not clear from the source whether  the two systems overlap, or serve
discrete  areas.
40  Tynan & Cowen (1998).
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*  free entry into telecoms, and the significant bypass and duplication
which has resulted, is generally considered  justified by the benefits of
competition  and innovation; and
*  the benefits of the free entry policy that allowed Ansett to enter the
New Zealand air service market in terms of lower fares and improved
quality outweigh the possible costs of duplicative scheduling. 41
Where investments are wastefully duplicative as a result of a game of chicken, the
investors will generally bear the costs.  Governments do not usually try to protect
private investors from the costs of their own mistakes, and it is not clear why this
should be a policy objective in the case of infrastructure  investors.
This point  is worth emphasising.  Investors often do  lose money when markets
become overcrowded, and  their investment duplicates that  of  others.  This has
happened in infrastructure repeatedly.  Canals were bankrupted by  railways.  US
railways competed each other into bankruptcy until they were reorganised by  JP
Morgan into trusts (cartels and monopolies) 4 2 These were later hit by the advent of
cars and trucks. The American car industry was hit by Japanese imports, fought back,
but now the global automobile industry is again suffering from overcapacity and
pressure on profits.  Similar stories exist in most industries.  The invention of the
power loom threw weavers out of work, and spawned  the Luddite movement. Corner
groceries have been outcompeted  by supermarkets  offering lower prices.  Equipment
for producing and viewing TV in black and white had to be scrapped when colour
came in.  This  in turn  will be  superseded with  the advent of  High  Definition
Television.
Governments generally  allow  investors  freedom to  choose  how  to  invest 4 3
Governments recognise that business people have the most information, ability and
incentives  to make good, profitable  business decisions.
If Government  tried to protect investors from loss by preventing  them from investing
in areas where their investment would duplicate existing capacity, the basic processes
of the market economy would  be subverted,  resulting  in enormous lose of welfare44
41  1996 Commerce Commission  Report on the proposed  acquisition of shares in Ansett Australia
by Air New Zealand.
42  Chernow (1997) p.23-24.
43  Generally but not always. The US Government  has tried to encourage the move to HDTV by
giving broadcasters spectrum for the purpose.  Governments in Europe and Japan have at
different times protected small retailers by imposing restrictions on the entry of large stores.
There are many such examples. But they are the exception, rather than the rule, and in many
cases have reduced welfare overall.
44  This can be seen by comparing socialist economies,  with Government directed investment into
priority areas, and strict rules against duplication of facilities and unauthorised entry, with
market economies,  in which entry and duplication are freely permitted.
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The issues in water, sanitation and power investments  are little different from those in
other areas of the economy. Under free entry, private investors may choose to enter.
If an existing monopoly is doing a good  job, meeting customers needs at a reasonable
price, entry will generally be unprofitable,  and no business person will invest. Where
business people do invest, it will usually signal that they see an unmet demand from
customers, or a way to provide service more cheaply than the incumbent.
In conclusion, this section has shown that there will be a few cases in which free
entry leads to inefficient duplication of investment.  But this is little different from
many other sectors of the economy. The possibility of duplication does not justify
any  significant restriction on  the  basic  presumption that  free entry  should be
permitted in the water, sanitation  and power industries.
An exception  to this general rule could be when:
*  there is no incumbent in a market; and
*  entry to the market is likely to be highly profitable.
It is in these situations that wasteful games of chicken have most commonly been
observed in other markets, such as US railroads, the personal computer market, and
the video recorder market.
In  such a  situation  government should consider a  mechanism such as  franchise
bidding, which  will  solve the  game  of  chicken problem, and  also  address the
regulatory issues discussed in Section 5.2. The government  should take into account
not only the likely costs from a game of chicken, but also the likelihood that market
solutions to the chicken problem will emerge.  It  is notable that in almost all the
examples  of chicken problems cited, it was not possible for entrants to establish long
term contracts with customers. Few people would buy a season ticket on a railroad
which had not yet been built, or agree to buy a video recorder which was not yet in
the shops.
In the case of networked supply of power, water and sanitation it frequently will be
possible to conclude long terms contracts prior to investing.  Indeed this is what is
observed.  For  example  two  companies were  in  competition to  build  a  gas
transmission pipeline between Chile and Argentina.  Rather than racing to invest,
each tried to collect long term contracts in advance. One secured enough contracts  to
go ahead;  the other did not, and gave up.
Given the costs of Government failure, managed entry, such as through franchise
bidding, should only be used in preference  to free entry where:
*  there is no incumbent in a market;
*  entry to the market  is likely to be highly profitable;
*  the costs to entrants of assembling  long term contracts with potential
customers would be high compared to the costs of a Government
awarded franchise; and
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*  the  Government  has  the  capacity  to  run  a  franchise  bid
successfully. 45
In other cases, the presumption  in favour of free entry should hold.
4.2  Universal  service issues and  cherry  picking
Governments often want to ensure that infrastructure services are widely available
throughout the country. Entry is often prohibited to protect cross-subsidies,  which are
intended as a way of extending service to areas which might not otherwise receive it,
and of providing service at below cost to low income consumers. This continues to
be one of the most pervasive arguments  for restricting entry.
Examples of exclusivity intended  to support  universal coverage include:
*  in  Jamaica, the National  Water  Commission is  legally the  sole
supplier of water.  It is required by central government to supply
water to remote and rural areas at below cost.  It covers the costs
through its charges to urban and industrial customers. This approach
is seen as an important  part of the country's development  strategy;
*  in the Punjab in India, farmers are supplied with electricity free of
charge. This is intended to promote rural development. Charges to
other consumers help to cover the costs of this policy; and
*  the UK water industry was charged with a statutory duty to have
special regard to the interests of rural consumers.  This has been
taken to justify continued cross-subsidies  from urban to rural water
consumers in England  and Wales.
Requirements on the incumbent to  provide universal service by  cross subsidising
certain customers often cannot be  maintained under a  free entry policy.  If the
monopolist is prevented from pricing at  incremental cost, others will be able to
provide a  lower cost supply to the  customers who bear the burden of the  cross
subsidy.  This can lead to 'cherry picking' or 'cream skimming', and undermine the
profitability of the incumbent monopolist.
Cherry picking and cream skimming are both terms which refer to the behaviour of
firms which enter the market to serve those customers  that generate the most profits.
Cherry picking is likely to occur where:
*  the incumbent's tariff is above the cost of supply to different groups,
or individuals;  and where
45  This is not to say that franchise  bidding should not be used where an existing monopoly is to
be privatised.  However, such bidding should generally be on the basis of a non-exclusive
franchise, so that entry by others is not prohibited.
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*  tariffs reflect the marginal cost of supply but do not take into account
the risk characteristics of different customers.  The expected return
from high risk customers is less than from low risk customers.  An
entrant could cherry pick by supplying  only low risk customers.
Cherry-picking is not likely to occur where the incumbent is free to adjust prices in
response  to entry, even if those prices are initially out of line with cost.
Where investors see a risk that a  liberalised entry policy may be reversed in the
future, we would expect entry to be less likely in industries with high sunk costs, and
long investment lead times. For example, cherry-picking  seems more likely by mini-
bus operators and  call-back companies, than  in water and  electricity distribution
services.
In situations in which the incumbent cross-subsidises, but free entry is allowed,
cherry picking is quite common. Examples include:
*  in the UK, through water inset appointments.  The inset appointments
give large users the ability to choose between possible suppliers.
Only two inset appointments have been approved by the regulator
thus  far. 46 However, the threat  of inset appointments has driven
substantial rebalancing of water tariffs throughout the industry, in
order to bring industrial  tariff more in line with costs; and
*  telecommunications companies  in  developing countries generally
subsidise local charges from international tariffs,  which are well
above cost. The huge success of call-back companies is entirely due
to this distortion.
Clearly cherry picking will have negative implications for the profitability of the
monopolist, and may undermine its ability to meet universal service obligations. For
example,  in  the  UK,  an  interesting tension  is  starting to  develop  between the
liberalisation of competition in the water industry, and the statutory requirement for
the industry to have special  regard to the interests  of rural consumers.
Cherry picking may also decrease productive efficiency.  An entrant can compete
even if it is a higher cost producer than the incumbent. For example, assume that it
costs an entrant US$0.08 per kWh to supply an industrial estate.  The incumbent can
exploit economies of scale, so its incremental cost of supply to the same estate is
US$0.06 per  kWh.  However, because of  its  policy of  cross-subsidisation, the
incumbent sells to the estate at US$0.10  per kWh. In this situation,  the entrant will be
successful,  increasing the total cost of electricity supply in the country.
While it could be argued that the incumbent could respond by dropping its price in
such a situation, in practice this may be difficult. For example, if an entrant threatens
to supply only one industrial customer with electricity, the incumbent would need to
46  One favour of  Anglian Water and against Essex and Sussex Water, and very recently one in
favour of Thames Water.
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drop its price to that customer.  In many countries, non-discrimination rules would
then require the incumbent to drop its prices to all industrial customers.  The loss of
revenue would be large, and generally could not be recovered by increasing tariffs to
residential or other consumers. Given this, the incumbent will often prefer to lose a
customer to an entrant than to drop its price. This phenomena can be observed in the
international  call-back market, where phone companies  prefer to lose some customers
to call-back companies, rather than reduce international  tariffs for all customers.
However cheny picking may also generate benefits. It at least makes cross subsidies
more  transparent.  It  generally  boosts allocative efficiency  by  reducing  cross-
subsidies as the incumbent finds they are unsustainable.  Cherry picking can also
improve productive efficiency, by creating pressure on the incumbent to  improve
internal  efficiency and reduce costs.
4.2.1  Problems with universal service requirements
There are a number of reasons why a desire to provide universal service will not
generally  justify restricting entry. These include:
*  subsidised  universal service may be a poor policy objective;
*  there are usually  better ways to provide  universal service; and
*  cross-subsidies often do  not work  to  provide  services to  target
groups.
Each  of  these  points  is  discussed below.  Nevertheless, there  are  times  when
restrictions on entry may be justified, either indefinitely or for a transition period.
These are discussed at the end of this section.
As  noted  by  Irwin  (1998),  subsidising infrastructure service tariffs  for  poor
consumers is unlikely to be an effective  means of assisting the poorest in developing
countries, as many do not receive the network service in question. Even where they
do  receive the benefit of the subsidy, they might well be better off with  a cash
subsidy, so that they can choose to spend the subsidy on whatever they need most.
For  example,  some households might  choose to  spend the  subsidy on  food or
education,  rather than water or electricity.
Where governments are committed to providing universal service, exclusivity is not
usually necessary to  implement such a  policy. Competitively neutral methods of
achieving  the same objective include:
*  voucher-like  systems for needy households. These are used in Chile
for water, and in Romania  for district heating; or
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levies  on all  industry  participants  paid  into a  fund  to  subsidise  any
firm which  supplies services to the target groups 4 7
The disadvantage  of these  options  is that  they  generally  require  higher  institutional
capacity  than a system of exclusivity  supported by cross-subsidies.
On the other hand, it must be bome  in mind that attempts to provide universal  service
by  supplying  target  groups  below  cost  frequently  fail.  This  is a  problem  for both
public  and private  operators.  For example:
*  in Trinidad,  the water  utility  was publicly  owned  and  operated  until
1996.  Only  11% of the  population  had  a continuous  water  supply.
This  11% was  predominantly  urban  and  well-to-do.  Customers  in
South  Trinidad,  a largely poor  and rural area,  seldom received  water
more than three times a week;
*  in  many  African  cities  large  proportions  of  the  population  do  not
receive piped  supply, and rely on private provision  by water vendors.
These vendors  charge much  more per cubic metre  supplied  than  the
formal  utilities.  For  example  in Mandera,  Kenya,  90%  of  the
population  receive water from  private vendors,  and spend on average
more than  30% of their  income on water;48 and
*  in Buenos Aires,  it is reported  that the  concessionaire  is not doing as
well  as was first hoped  in expanding service  to unserved  areas of the
city.  The  concessionaire  is  reluctant  to  expand  service,  since  the
tariff  structure means it will generally  lose money by doing so.
In many  developing  countries  a monopoly  supplies  water or electricity  at below  cost
to  higher  income  customers,  while  slums  get  no  service.  This  approach  is often
institutionalised,  with  utility  master  plans  simply  not  including  any  provision  for
slums.  In  many  cases  poor  consumers  rely  on  high  cost  water  carriers,  and  do
without  electricity,  or  connect  illegally.  In  this  situation,  free  entry  could  hardly
make coverage  and equity worse,  and could help.
Examples  of entry helping to expand service to target groups include:
the Orangi Pilot Project in Karachi.  Orangi is a slum area in Karachi,
which  had extremely  poor  sanitation.  Community  groups  developed
and implemented  successful low cost piped sanitation  systems.  If the
47  Irwin, Price Structures, Cross-subsidies and Competition in Infrastructure Public Policy for
the Private Sector 1997.
48  Lewis, Maureen and Miller, Ted R. (1997) Public -Private Partnership in Water Supply and
Sanitation in Sub-Saharan  Africa Health Policy and Planning, (2) 1.
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incumbent utility had had and enforced exclusive rights, this could
not have happened; 49
*  similarly, the  Indian city  of Ahmedebad is developing successful
'slum networking' projects. These bring low cost network services
into  slum  areas,  supported by  local businesses  and  community
groups.  Again, they  would  not  be  possible unless  entry  was
permitted; and
*  in Maputo, Mozambique,  wealthy residents with (subsidised) piped
water supply run informal plastic-pipe systems to supply water from
their connection  into low income areas. They sell the water for much
more than it costs them, and at prices which can cause real hardship
to their low income customers.  These informal systems are illegal,
and the price-gouging of the poor by the well-off, using subsidised
water, is generally regarded as inequitable.  On the other hand, at
least this  system provides the  poor areas  with  a  piped  supply.
Enforcing the prohibition on such systems would remove a valuable
service.  Conversely, removing the prohibition would help to bring
the systems out from the underworld.  Since the pipe-systems are
cheap to install, it could even open the way for competition between
suppliers  to the slums.
A similar example can be found in the electricity sector in the Yemen where the
public utility meets urban electricity demand, but does not supply rural towns and
villages.  There is little prospect of significantly improving the proportion of rural
grid-connected households in the next two decades, but small scale private sector
operators have demonstrated a willingness and innovative approaches  to meeting the
demand.  These small-scale providers range from individual households generating
for their own use and supplying neighbours, to larger operators supplying up to 200
households and  operating sophisticated billing systems.  The result is that rural
household electricity use in the Yemen is remarkably  high compared to other middle
income countries. 50
4.2.2  Policy implications
The key policy implications of this discussion  are that:
*  subsidised universal service is often a poor policy objective. Where
governments do  not have such an objective, there  is no  need to
restrict entry on this account;
*  in many places, attempts to provide universal service through cross-
subsidies  supported by  exclusivity have  failed  to  achieve  their
49  Solo and Snell (1997).
50  ESMAP  (1991).
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objectives.  In  such circumstances, restrictions  on  entry  should
usually be removed;  and
*  where universal service supported by exclusivity is working, it will
generally be better to switch to a competitively neutral mechanisms
to support universal service. Once this has been done, restrictions on
entry will no longer be justified.
In some cases, Governments  will be committed to universal service,  but will not have
the  capacity  to  administer competitively neutral  mechanisms.  In  such  cases,
restrictions on entry may be justified, if there are good prospects that this approach
will achieve the objective.
Where Government decides to  move away from a  policy of cross-subsidisation,
consideration could be given to  continuing to  limit entry for  a transition period.
Otherwise, higher cost suppliers may be able to enter the market and take advantage
of price distortions before the incumbent is able to rebalance tariffs.  If the entrant has
sunk costs, and can lock in demand through long term contracts,  then this could result
in a higher overall cost structure  for the industry.
4.3  Exclusivity  and involving  the  private  sector
Exclusivity  is  often  granted  to  encourage private  sector  participation  in  an
infrastructure sector. Exclusivity clauses have been a very common component of
moves to involve the private sector (e.g. the granting of concessions, leases, or assets
sales) in telecommunications,  water and electricity. For example:
*  in Jamaica, when the telecommunication  utility was privatised in the
1980's a 25 year exclusivity clause was included;
*  in South Africa in  1997 an exclusivity period of five years was
extended to Telkom for local long distance and international  services.
Under the agreement  Telkom was obliged to meet a series of service
extension and quality improvement  targets, and is subject to financial
penalties if it fails to meet those targets;51 and
*  in Buenos Aires, as in most places which have involved the private
sector in water supply, the water concession gives the concessionaire
the exclusive right to supply water within the concession zone.  In
other words,  competitive  entry is prohibited.
51  Financial Times Business Report:  Technology  (Q3:35) 13 February 1997.
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An example  of the value of exclusivity  clauses  is given  by Hong Kong. In  1998 the
Hong  Kong  government  paid  US$866  million  (HK$6.7  billion)  to  Hong  Kong
Telecom to buy out the last eight years of its exclusive international  license.5 2
It is important  to unravel  why exclusivity  is granted.  In many  cases it is to preserve
cross-subsidies.  This was the case  in South Africa telecommunications  for example,
and it may have been a factor in Buenos Aires water.
If the private  investor  is not required  to preserve  cross subsidies,  the main  benefit  of
exclusivity  is to remove  the demand risk created by competitive  entry.  As discussed
in  Section  4.1,  there  may  also be  occasions  in which  it can  increase  efficiency  by
reducing the risk of inefficient  duplication  of facilities.
4.3.1  Circumstances  in which exclusivity may be important
If  a  government  is  intent  on  maintaining  cross  subsidies  (and  will  not  adopt  a
competitively  neutral  method  for  cross  subsidisation  as  outlined  in  Section 4.2
above), then it is very likely that an exclusivity clause will be required.
If exclusivity  is granted  to remove  demand  risk, the  value  of the  exclusivity  clause
will vary across industries.  We distinguish  between these three cases:
*  competitive  entry  is unlikely,  such  as  in water  distribution  (with  no
cross subsidy requirements);
*  competitive  entry  is likely,  for  example  in bus  services  or  cellular
phones,  and  consequently  exclusivity  is valuable  to the  incumbent;
and
e  competitive  entry  will  only  result  from  a  positive  decision  by
Government.  For example  planning  approvals  and  land  acquisitions
for urban  rail, toll  roads  or airports,  are often  so complex  that  new
entrants require special legal support from Government.
In  the  first  case,  where  exclusivity  has  a  very  low value,  not  granting  exclusivity
should not affect the willingness  of the private sector to invest.
In  the  second  case  where  exclusivity  is valuable,  it is also  very  also  costly  to  the
economy  as a whole.  Governments  need to weigh  up whether  the  benefits  of private
participation  outweigh  the costs of the hidden subsidy,  and also whether  exclusivity  is
the  least  cost way to deliver the  subsidy.  Often there will be  better options,  such as
accepting  a lower sale price for the asset.
In the third case, the Government  has private information  about its likely future action
which  is highly  valuable  to  an  investor.  A  toll  road  to the  airport  may  be  worth
52  31 March  1998 Reuter News Service - Far East  Reuter Textline (Q2:60). March  1998
Exchange rate US$1:IK$:7.74 as at March 1998.
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building,  but not if within  a few years a new rail line will opened to compete  with it.
53
If the Government  does not envisage facilitating  a competitor,  it needs a credible way
to  signal  this  to  the  first  investor.  If  it does  not  signal  its  intention  credibly,  the
investor  may assign too high a probability  to the Government promoting  a competitor
in the  future,  and not  invest,  (or demand  higher fares, or make  a lower payment  for
the franchise  right).  A good way for the Government  to credibly  signal  its intention
not to promote  a competitor  is to grant an exclusive franchise.
It  is important  to bear  in mind however,  that  the  private  sector  often does  invest  in
infrastructure  without exclusivity.  For example:
*  water  supply  to  London  in the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  centuries
was  developed  largely  by  private  firms  operating  under  non-
exclusive  franchises;54
*  investors  in US railroads  at in second half of the  nineteenth  century
seldom  had  exclusivity  rights.  Sometimes,  other companies  would
start  to  lay competing  lines  solely  to extort  payment  from  the  first
company  for abandoning  the  line.55 Nevertheless,  huge  sums were
invested:  $300  million  in the  1840s,  and  $840  more  in the  1850s,
mostly  from  foreign  investors.  These  sums translate  to billions  of
dollars  in  today's  money.  By  the  1890s,  roughly  60%  of  the
companies  on the New York Stock Exchange  were railroads;56 and
*  in the  present  day,  as  Box  4-5  illustrates,  private  companies  are
risking  billions  of  dollars  in satellite  communications  infrastructure
which  will serve developing  countries without exclusivity.
It  is worth  noting  that  it is often the  lack of  Government  restrictions  on  entry  and
other  aspects  of  business  which  encourages  private  investment.  This  year  the  US
company  Formus  Communications  invested  substantial  sums  to  purchase  radio
spectrum  in New  Zealand.  Formus  plans  to  provide  a  wireless  Local  Multipoint
Distribution  System  (LMDS).  This  is  a  new  broadband  technology  capable  of
providing  phone  service,  subscriber-TV  and  high-speed  internet  access.  The  key
reason  for choosing  New  Zealand  for one  of the company's  first  investments  in this
area was that country's  extremely  liberal policies  on entry in the telecommunications
market.
53  This could be explained  as a 'market for lemons' problem. See Akerlof, George, "The Market
for  'Lemons:  Quality  Uncertainty and  the  Market Mechanism  Quarterly  Journal  of
Economics (August 1970).
54  Tynan and Cowen (1998).
55  Chernow (1997)  p.20.
56  Wasserstein (1998)  p.33-34.
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4.3.2  Policy  implications
As noted above isats  ly a  exclusivity clauses will be required if govewments
wish to retain cross subsidies, and are not willing to develop a competitively neutral
way to implement  them.
In the absence of  irements on the operator to cross subsidise some consumers:
a*ros  mwhere  the likelihood of entry is low,  iovesments  should explore
whether private investors really value legal exclusivity, and aim to
avoid  restricting  entry.  Often  not  granting  a  legal  monopoly  will
have public relations benefits which add value for the investor by
making the transaction  more politically  sustainable;
*reeo  oif  entry is  likely, the  benefits and  costs  of exclusivity must be
carefully evaluated, in order to assess the lowest cost ways to meet
the government's objectives for the sector. Often there will be better
options than granting exclusivity. For ext  a  ple govenments  may
accept a lower sale price or grant limited guarantees to cover certain
risks; and
when intervention  by Goveament would be required to allow further
entry,  and  Government  does  not  intend  to  allow  such  entry,  it will
often be best to grant exclusivity.
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Exclusivity is common in private infrastructure deals, so investors may be unduly
nervous about deals which do not involve exclusivity. Another way of saying this is
that,  given  a  lack of  experience with non-exclusive transactions, investors may
mistakenly overprice the risk of non-exclusivity. Given information asymmetries
between investors and the governments, investors may also interpret the refusal to
grant exclusivity as a signal that competition  is more likely than it really is.
Where  governments cannot  persuade  investors  to  price  non-exclusivity more
appropriately, a good compromise may be to offer exclusivity for a limited period.
For example, short five or seven year exclusivity periods have become common in
telecommunications, for  example in the  South Africa example mentioned above.
Offering such terms may give investors sufficient comfort, without doing undue
harm. Again, it will be a case-by-case  decision.
4.4  Scheduling and routing
In some infrastructure  industries the timing of delivery to certain parts of the network
is  of  key  importance.  This  is  particularly  significant  in  industries  such  as
transportation or telecommunications  where storage costs (or costs of delay) are high,
and services are not homogeneous  but have a value that is determined largely by the
route. Where this is the case, routing and time-tabling become additional constraints
that need to be taken into account in the network optimisation problem.
Scheduling  and routing problems could arise as a result of:
*  ongoing revision of schedules in an attempt to reach a point in the
network ahead of competitors - the problem of the three ice-cream
sellers on the beach; and
e  ldifficulty  in co-ordinating timing and establishing optimal delivery
schedules  across a complex  network.
4.4.1  Schedule jockeying - unstable market equilibrium
In industries where timing is the key determinant of the consumption decision, free
entry may not arrive at a stable market equilibrium and may not generate beneficial
competition.
This can be illustrated by reference  to the game theoretic example outlined in Section
4.1.3 above of two ice cream sellers on a beach co-locating. 5 7 When there are three
ice cream sellers rather than two, the sellers will not settle at a stable position on the
beach.  The sellers will continue to re-locate, each one adjusting according to the
position established by the other two in an attempt to maintain or improve position in
the market relative to the competitors.  The deciding factor in consumers' demand
57  We note that as (discussed in footnote 37), the literature  is inconclusive about the impact of the
number of players on the stability  and location  of market equilibrium.
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decision  is proximity,  so  location  is key  to  market  share, and  thus to  revenue  and
profits.
This  outcome  has  occurred  in some  cases where  there  has been  free entry  in urban
bus  industries.  Scheduling  is  a  problem  because  waiting  time  is  so  dominant  in
passengers'  travel  decisions  that customers will  almost always take the  first bus that
comes.  This  leads to ongoing revisions  of schedules  as each  bus company  seeks to
schedule  its  services just  ahead  of the competitors'  services.  Furthermore,  it means
there is little  incentive to compete strongly on price or quality.
For example,  problems  emerged  following  the deregulation  of urban buses in Britain
during  the  1980s.  All urban bus  services  (except  in London)  were  deregulated  and
privatised.  Where  competition  occurred  entrants  competed  by  scheduling  services
along  the  same  routes  for very  similar  fares.  Destructive  competition  emerged  as
routes  were  swamped  by incumbents  responding  by  trying  to  schedule  services  so
frequently that entrants  could not get enough passengers to be viable 58
Scheduling  problems  such as this are most  likely to occur  where the demand decision
is dominated  by timing considerations  and there is:
*  a homogeneous product with little value attached  to brand;
*  low sunk costs; and
*  low costs of changing timetables.
A  market  solution  could  exist  to  these  problems.  If  competition  over  routes  and
schedules  is unsustainable,  one could assume  that the competing  firms would have an
incentive to define geographical monopolies.  However, the question remains whether:
*  transaction  costs  and  competition  law  would  allow  such  a  market
solution to occur;
*  the  solution  would  be  sustainable  since  new companies  which  were
not part of the  original  agreement  could  always  enter an  established
company's  area; and
*  the  process  of  arriving  at  the  market  solution,  and  indeed  the
equilibrium  outcome, would be less costly to society than restrictions
on entry and competitive  award of monopoly franchises.
In  industries  such  as  urban  transport,  the  typical  regulatory  response  has  been
franchising  of monopoly  rights to groups  of routes.  Where there are low  sunk costs,
frequent  tendering  for  monopoly  franchises  may  offer  a  good  solution.  While  it
prevents  free entry  for the  period  of the  franchise,  it offers  regular  opportunities  to
58  Klein,  Daniel  and  Moore,  Adrian,  Schedule  jockeying  and  route  swamping:  bus  markets  in
Britain  need kerb rights Institute  of Economic  Affairs (June  1997).
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firms to enter  the market,  thereby  maintaining  competitive  pressures.  This has been
followed  in the Hong Kong bus industry, for example.
We  are  not aware  of  any  instance when  schedule jockeying  has  been a  problem  in
network  water  supply  or  electricity  distribution.  It  is  difficult  to  conceive  of  a
situation  in which  it could occur.
4.4.2  Optimal  delivery  schedules  in  a  complex  network
A  policy  of free  entry, and  the existence  of a number  of  competitors  in the  market,
can  increase  the  complexity  of optimising  delivery  schedules  across  a network.  As
the number  of firms  competing  for use of the network increases  so does the difficulty
of  efficiently  adjusting  delivery  in  response  to  changing  demand  and  supply
conditions.
Optimising  delivery  schedules becomes  important when:
*  the  good  or service  is not  storable,  or the  costs  of  storage  are  very
high; and/or
*  the units  are not homogeneous  such that value of any unit or service
is  a  function  of  delivering  it  to  a  particular  customer  or  specific
points  in  the  network  at  certain  times,  for  example  in  transport
services, or communications.
In  industries  such  as  aviation,  railways  and  telecommunications,  both  of the  above
two  conditions  apply.  The costs of delay are high, and the  service is differentiated  by
its  supplier,  its  route and  schedule.  For example,  a service  by  one  airline  may  be
valued  differently  from  the  same  service  supplied  by  another  airline  (because  of
quality  of service,  safety concerns etc.).  Free  entry, and the presence  of competitors
will  clearly  increase  the  complexity  of  optimising  delivery  schedules  in  such  a
system.
A  market  solution  could  work through  defining  rights  over  points  in the  network,
allocating  those  rights,  and  then  allowing  trading  to  occur.  It  should  ensure  that
rights  are allocated  to the highest value user.  This would be a complex market and, as
Klein  argues,  decentralised  bargaining  may  not  generate  an  optimal  timetable  or
allocation  of  routes  through  the  network.59 A computer  based auction  system  that
simultaneously  generates the optimal prices and set of paths through the network may
be required  to achieve  optimality.  Such a  system could  be highly  complex,  and  the
costs to market participants  of understanding  and using the system could  also be high.
It has  long been argued  that a market system  to allocate  landing  slots  or track rights
could  be  applied  in airports  and railways,  but to date one has  not been  implemented.
It has been considered  in the UK for airport landing  slots and railways,  and in Sweden
59  Klein, Michael.,  Competition in Network Industries Private Sector Development Department,
World Bank.
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for railways. 6 0 Markets do exist for telecommunication  capacity, but as yet these use
long term contracts, and do not have any  spot-clearing mechanisms, making the
resulting allocation of capacity  less than perfect.
The typical regulatory response in railway and airports has been to use variations on
administrative processes for allocating rights.  These administrative processes are
costly and unlikely to generate an efficient outcome. Although policy makers have
not embraced market solutions to  allocation problems  in these  industries, even
imperfect market solutions may be better than existing administrative approaches.
Courier  companies,  trucking  businesses  and  deregulated  telecommunications
companies provide examples  of imperfect but highly workable solutions to many of
these problems.
Nevertheless, it  is sometimes argued that scheduling and routing problems are a
market failure, which justify restrictions on entry to ensure that administrative co-
ordination can be achieved.  Difficulty in obtaining slots at Heathrow airport, for
example, is a major barrier to entry to European civil aviation markets. How do these
argument apply to water, sanitation  and power?
Water is storable at low cost, and is generally a homogenous  product.  Wastewater is
less homogenous, in that different industrial process can produce different wastes,
which may need to be treated in different ways.  However it also easily stored.
Scheduling and routing  issues are unlikely to  be a  major concem in water and
sanitation, and would not justify restrictions  on free entry.
Electricity itself non-storable.  Electrical energy can be stored by converting it into
other forms of energy.  Rechargeable  batteries are an example, but this method of
storing energy is so expensive that is viable only in specialised uses.  Power utilities
in several countries use 'pumped storage'.  Off-peak energy is used to pump water
uphill into a reservoir.  At peak times, the water is allowed to flow down again,
passing through turbines and generating electricity.  However, the cost of storage is
very high. In addition to the cost of the storage facilities themselves, much energy is
used in the process.  It is only the large price differential between peak and off-peak
power which makes this approach viable. This is in marked contrast to water, where
the product itself does not diminish  in value by being stored.
The location on an electricity grid of suppliers and demanders  of energy also matters.
As power flows through a network, transmission capacity surplus or deficit is a
function of total flows throughout the system. In an open access system it is difficult
therefore to  define capacity or access rights to  a power system.  Long term un-
tradable  contracts are not an efficient way to  match supply and  demand.  This
problem can be resolved through a central dispatch system which optimises system
flows, and instantaneously matches supply and demand such that the highest value
user is supplied. 61
60  Klein, Michael.
61  Klein, Michael.
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Various forms of central dispatch  systems for electricity have been set up in a number
of countries, with considerable success.  In Argentina, a competitive market was
introduced in 1992, in which bids are based on audited costs of power plants rather
than  generators' price bids.  Klein notes that the switch to  a private competitive
system quickly resolved all the urgent problems of power shortages and created a
situation of temporary excess capacity as new generating firms rehabilitated and
operated existing plants.62
The value of central despatch optimisation  may justify some govemment intervention
in the industry.  But it should be noted that market participants have incentives to
maximise gains from trade by creating efficient trading systems. Box 4-2 provides an
example of how markets can reach efficient despatch solutions,  even when these are
not designed into the market  structure  from the start.
EBox  442  Norwegian  over-and-under  electricity  pooi
The Norwegian electricity industry contains around ten competing generators,  and
several hundred electricity retailers.  There are  long term contracts between the
geterators and the retailers. Exclusive and non-tradable  long term contracts are not
the most efficient way for generators  to interact with retailers. This is because  there
will be times when one generator is contracted to supply a retailer, but another
generator could in fact do it more cheaply.
Recopising  the gains from trading in this situation, the generators initially created
a  market in which  they could trade  between themselves.  This means that  if
Generator A is contracted  to supply electricity to a customer, but Generator B could
produce the  electicity  more  cheaply,  Generator  A  can  meet  its  contractual
obligations by purchasing the electricity from B in the spot market, and then on-
selling it to the customer.
The market has subsequently  evolved to include demand side bidding. This means
for example,  that  if a customer  has a long term contract,  and  does  not want  to use
the full amount for which it has contracted,  it can sell the portion it does not wish to
use in the market, effectively adding it to supply.  Customers can also purchase
electricity in the spot market.
It has recently been extended to incorporate  trading with Sweden and Denmark. The
result  is  that the  Norwegian system has evolved  into a  market with efficient
despatch of generation (99% hydro) that allows market participants to optimise
storage level in their reservoirs.
This suggests that while free entry might initially produce a system with inefficient
despatch,  as the potential  gains from efficient  despatch  grow, it is realistic to expect
market participants to develop an efficient despatch system, to allow them to realise
those gains.
62  Klein, Michael
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4.4.3  Policy implications.
Free  entry  is unlikely  to  create  scheduling  and  routing  problems  in the  water  and
sanitation  industry because:
*  the  high  sunk costs  and  difficulty  of relocating  means  that  ongoing
repositioning  is unlikely to be a problems;
water  is storable so the problem  of matching  timing  of delivery  and
capacity  is less significant;  and
*  water  is a homogenous  product (wastewater  may  be less so) and  the
value of a cubic meter to the consumer  should not be greatly affected
by its supply route.
Scheduling  is  however  an  issue  in  the  electricity  industry  because  in  electricity
timing  matters,  and  the  capacity  in the  system  at  any  moment  is a  function  of  all
flows  throughout  the  system.  This  is only  a  problem  on complex  inter-connected
systems.  While  free entry by itself is not likely initially  to result  in a complex  inter-
connected  system,  in time  it could  result  in such  a  system.  However,  for  that  to
occur,  either  the  Government  or  the  market  would  need  to  resolve  the  common
carriage  problem.  The  same  mechanism  used  to  resolve  the  common  carriage
problem  could  also  be  used  to  resolve  the  despatch  problem.  That  is,  either  the
government  or  the  market  could  determine  the  despatch  mechanism  concurrently
with  or  subsequent  to  determining  the  common  carriage  arrangements.  Therefore,
routing  and scheduling  problems  do not justify  restrictions  on free entry.
In summary,  scheduling  and routing problems  will not generally  be a reason to limit
free  entry for water  and  electricity.  Some  policy  interventions  may  be justified  for
industries  with  low  sunk  costs,  such  as  solid  waste  collection  and  buses.  Bidding
exclusive  franchises  is one option.  Other options  should  also be considered,  such  as
simply  requiring  operators to publish  and adhere to timetables.
4.5  Environmental quality and safety outcomes
To the extent  that infrastructure  providers have an incentive to reduce cost or increase
revenues,  they  will  have  an  incentive  to  give  inadequate  weight  to  environmental
values.  For example,  many water utilities  over-abstractacquifers,  because this can be
the cheapest  way to supply water to people. If personal injury law does not provide an
effective  deterrent,  utilities  may  also  skimp  on  safety.  For  these  reasons,
Governments  often  impose  environmental  and  safety  obligations  on  infrastructure
providers.
In  some instances  environmental  and safety problems  may become  acute if free entry
is allowed and competition  develops.  This could result from two factors:
*  as  the  number  of  providers  increases,  the  job  of  enforcing
environmental  and safety standards becomes  harder; and
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competition  increases the pressures on providers to cut costs and win
customers.  This  increases  their  incentive  to  cut  corners  on
environmental  quality and safety.
4.5.1  The enforcement  problem
In  many  developing  countries  enforcement  capability  is  limited.  As  illustrated  in
Figure 4-1, free entry changes the nature of the enforcement  problem.
-igii~e 44:  F%e  i  requfrements  under restricted  eivq  and fre- entqy
Restricted  Entry  Free  Entry
Required  to enforce  a general  Required  to enfore
law across many, and detailed  detailed laws across
laws across a few providers  many providers
Under  restricted  entry, enforcement  agencies  only have to police  a broad requirement
across  the  whole  industry:  that  unlicensed  providers  do  not  enter  the  industry.
Policing  of detailed safety, quality and environmental  regulations  is limited  to the few
licensed  providers.  Where a free entry policy results  in an increase  in the  number of
providers,  the  enforcement  agencies  must  police  specific  laws  across  a  greater
number  of  firms.  In  some  instances  this  may  be  beyond  the  capability  of  those
agencies.
4.5.2  Effect of increased competitive pressure
Where  specification,  monitoring  and  enforcement  of  environmental  and  safety
standards  are  poor, the  issue  of whether  to  allow  entry can be  analysed  in terms  of
high and low powered incentives.
The theory  is as follows63 : Imagine a worker  whose output has some attributes  which
are easily monitored,  and others which are hard to monitor.  The worker can be given
either  high  or  low  powered  incentives.  High  powered  incentives  are  ones  which
strongly  motivate  performance.  Piece work rates  and success fees are both examples
of  high  powered  incentives.  Low powered  incentives  are  less performance  related.
63  See Milgrom and Roberts, Economics  Organisation and Management 1992 Chapters 7 and 12
for further discussion.
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For example, a fixed monthly salary is a low powered incentive compared to piece
rates or bonuses based on profitability.
At first sight it might seem more efficient to always use higher powered incentives.
In fact, this can be counter-productive. If some of the desired attributes are hard to
measure, high-powered incentives  cannot be provided for these attributes. Providing
higher powered incentives on  the other attributes will skew the worker's  efforts
toward the measurable outputs, with a loss on the unmeasurable outputs.  Lower
powered incentives will not motivate such hard work on the measurable outputs, but
will also not cause effort to be diverted from desirable but hard to measure outputs.
Often the overall result from the lower powered  incentives  will be better.
To give an example, the number of studies reviewed by a consultant in preparing a
report is relatively easy to measure, while the quality of the consultant's analysis of
those studies is harder to assess.  The client is interested in maximising both the
number of studies reviewed and the quality  of the analysis. A high powered incentive
scheme, such as a low fixed fee coupled  with a bonus for each study reviewed, would
probably result in  poor analysis. The client can do better by simply setting a fixed
fee for the whole project, even though  this does not motivate the consultant to review
so many studies.
Turning to  utilities, we  see that  they produce a  range of  desirable outputs and
characteristics, which vary in how well they can be measured. For example, profit is
easy to measure.  Where capacity to monitor and enforce environmental and safety
standards is low,64 environmental and safety characteristics are obviously hard to
measure.
In a monopoly environment, the pressure to make profits is often lower than in a
competitive environment. When competition is introduced, the pressure to increase
revenues and cut costs gets stronger.  In other words, the power of the commercial
incentives increases.  However, the  power of the  environmental and  safety and
incentives remains as low as before. In this situation,  the industry's behaviour can be
skewed away from environmental  and safety objectives. It is possible that the loss on
these objectives would outweigh  the gains from increased  commercial efficiency.
Box 4-3 illustrates a problem of enforcement caused by free entry, and arguably also
a skewing of incentives  toward commercial  performance  at the cost of safety6 5
64  Enforcement capacity could often be increased by spending more on the enforcement  agency,
but in many countries Government  budget constraints  prevent this.
65  As well as a time-tabling  problem  (see Section 4.4).
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BXx  43: LW enforcement  under friee  entry in the Jabiaicim  bus:  market
In  Jamaica,  largey free entry  was allowed  into what had been a Govemment
urban bus monopoly  in Kingston. Tis  resulted  innumerous  under-capitalised
owner-operatots  e industy.  The  bus opeators would  rae  along  city
streetsto beat rivals:to  the next  stop. They  even  took shortcuts,  going off road
and  through  public  parks. The  buses  themselves  weoften  under-maintained-and
overloaded.
In this case, strit  enforcement  of the traffic code would have stopped the
problem.-  .t  the nur  of oenders,- and their st  ives  to  offend,
overwhelmdaaica  s:enforemt  capacity. :The'  ble  was probaly
worsened  by the fad that the businesses  were smal, underapitalised  and only
marginally rofitabl.Since  t  d Fit  toJose, it was  d to apply  e
':.n:arg  . ,  .::al'  -y.;:-.r..',  .. '..  :  ''..  I  th  y  litle  . :.:  ,.  '  . E  :':' sanctions.
Te  Governments  approach  o  he  safety and  quality problems- caused::  by
nunerous small operators  has been to encourage  the industry  to  Rge  into a
smal number  of lger  companies  each  of which  was then  awarded  anxlusve
ftanchise  to an area of city. Whatever  the merits  of this approach  overall,  casual
observation  suggests  that it has  ead to  geater  discipline  and fewer safety
infTingements  in the industry.
A similar example is provided by cable TV industries in many developing countries.
Often  cable operators are small scale entrepreneurs  who pirate programming  from a
satellite feed, and distribute it through a small neighbourhood  network, in breach of
the intellectual property rights of the programme owners.  Because their operations
are small scale, with fairly low sunk costs, they are very hard to police.  Again, the
solution in Jamaica and elsewhere has been to award a limited number of exclusive
geographic franchises.  Each franchise holder then has an incentive to stop pirates
operating in  their area, while the  Government is able to  ensure that  the  larger
operators comply with the law.
4.5.3  Industries  where enforcement problems are most likely to occur
In general, the problem of enforcing environmental,  safety and other legal obligations
will be greater the lower the sunk costs of the industry, the smaller the efficient scale
of operations, and the poorer the government's enforcement capacity.  Table 4-1
provides a judgmental categorisation  of various infrastructure  and related industries.
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Likely  Bus transport
Water trucking
Night soil collection/ cesspool emptying
Bottled gas supply
Cable TV
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _....  .....  ..... e  ....... __.  -.  ...  ........- ~  -~~~~~  ..................  ........  .........  ...........  .
Less likely  Small scale water abstraction
Packet  sewage treatment





Even  industries  in the  'least  likely'  category  will  infringe  environmental  and  safety
obligations  if there  is no enforcement  at all.  In all cases, the best  solution  will be to
effectively  enforce  safety,  environmental  and other obligations  on all  participants  in
the  industry.  However,  in cases  where  enforcement  capacity  exists  but  is  limited,
limiting  entry  can  assist  enforcement.  In  some  cases,  the  benefits  of  better
enforcement  will outweigh  the costs of limiting entry.
4.5.4  Policy implications
Where  enforcement  capacity  is  low,  the  costs  of  greater  infringement  of  safety,
quality,  and  environmental  regulations  may  in  some  cases outweigh  the  benefits  of
increased  competitive  pressure.  Restrictions  on entry may  be justified,  especially  in
those  industries  such as public transport  where the risks of enforcement  problems  are
highest.
In  electricity  generation  our judgement  would  be  that  environmental  concems  will
only  occasionally  justify  restrictions  on entry.  Generators  are  usually  fairly few  in
number,  and easy to spot.  An environmental  agency  which  can police  the generation
stations  of the  incumbent  will usually  also be  able to police  the  generators  of  a few
entrants.
Safety concerns  exist in all parts  of an electricity  network.  However,  those  who are
hurt  by or  at risk  of unsafe electricity  installations  usually  have  a direct  incentive  to
enforce  safety  provisions  themselves.  So  long  as  personal  injury  law  functions
reasonably  well, safety concerns are unlikely to justify  limitations  on entry.  If there is
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a risk of under-capitalised  operators  entering the industry,  a requirement to have third
party liability insurance could be justified06
In the water industry, safety is much less of a concern, but environmental  issues can
be very important. Each situation needs to be assessed on its own merits. There may
well be cases in which:
*  an acquifer or important marine habitat would be seriously damaged
by uncontrolled  water abstraction  or sewage discharge; and
*  such abstraction is much more likely if anyone who wants to is
allowed to sink their own well or operate a sanitation  business.
In such cases restrictions on entry may well be justified.  This is particularly  the case
for  water abstraction.  Creating a  monopoly abstractor partially  intemalises the
environmental  externality. That is, because the water company is the only one using
the acquifer, it suffers more of the costs of over pumping, and therefore will have
both the incentive and the ability to limit over-abstraction. Note however that the
intemalisation is only partial.  Problems of subsidence,  for example, will continue to
affect people other than the abstractor.
Restrictions  on entry will not be justified if any of these conditions  hold:
*  the environments  are not under pressure;
*  enforcement capacity  is good; or
*  enforcement capacity  is  so  low  that  the  incumbent  is  already
seriously  infringing  environmental standards, and  there  is  little
prospect of this changing.
66  This would be similar for the requirement which exists in many countries for motor vehicle
drivers to have third party liability  insurance.
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5  Associated systems
A policy  of free entry would  have political  implications  and effects  on other areas of
regulation.  This  section  explores  the  likely  impact  of  free entry  on  other technical
economic  and political  systems. We outline the relationship  between  free entry and:
*  technical  standards  regulation  and  the  development  of  integrated
systems;
*  broader economic regulation;  and
*  the politics  of monopoly and free entry.
5.1  Technical standards and integrated systems
If a  free entry policy  is to be adopted  it becomes  important  to ensure  that  technical
standards regulation:
*  promotes  the  development  of  systems  that  can  be  connected  to
provide  an integrated  system in the future;
*  does not create unnecessary  barriers to entry; and
*  and does not limit the ability of firms to innovate.
The question  of what  technical standard to adopt is a clear  illustration  of the 'battle  of
the  sexes'  game.67 This  game  is characterised  by  the  following  preferences  and
interaction.  Two  people are planning  to meet for an evening.  John prefers to go to a
knitting  evening,  and Sue to go to a sumo wrestling  evening,  but each would rather be
with each  other than  apart.  The worst  possible  outcome  is that  John  ends  up at the
wrestling  demonstration  and  Sue at the knitting.  Each knows  the other's  preference,
and  must  plan  their  actions  according  to their  expectation  of how the  other will act.
Co-ordination  could assist the couple in arriving at the most preferred option.  It is not
clear,  however  that  co-ordination  will always  succeed especially  given  the  difficulty
of  assessing  the  relative  strength  of  each  person's  preferences,  and  gains  from  co-
ordination.  It would  be  possible to always  ensure  the preferred  outcome  is reached
(i.e. going to the  same event)  if a decision  can be made and  enforced (either  by John
or Sue or by a third party).
In  the  case  of  technological  standards,  a  battle  of  the  sexes  problem  could  occur
where  the  incumbent,  company  A, has  a  50 Hz electricity  system  that  supplies  the
main  urban  centres  in  the  north  of  the  country,  and  is  expanding  rural  supply.
Company  B  is proposing  to  set  up to  supply  the  south  using  a  60Hz  cycle.  Each
company  wants  to use  its preferred  technology  and  system,  but their  most  preferred
outcome  is  that  compatible  systems  are  used  and  an  integrated  network  can  be
67  Kay, John (1993).
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developed in the future.  The worst outcome is that both firms use technology and
develop systems  other than that which they prefer.
Examples of where technical standardisation  has failed to occur include:
*  Jamaica has a 50hz interconnected  electricity grid which now covers
most of the country.  Before the grid was so widespread foreign
owned bauxite companies installed their own  generating systems
based on a 60hz cycle.  The peak times on the bauxite systems differ
from overall system peaks.  It would be highly beneficial in terms of
cost and security of supply to connect the bauxite generating plants to
the grid. However,  the incompatible  technical standards  prevent this;
*  in several parts of the world, different organisations  built railways of
different  gauges.  The networks extended to the  point that  they
connect, and it would be highly beneficial for passengers and goods
to  be able to move from one system to another without changing
trains.  However, the different gauges make this impossible. Places
where this problem exists include Australia, Spain, and the railway
connection between  Thailand and Malaysia; and
in telecommunications,  the failure to establish a common standard
internationally for phones jacks means that at times, wiring and plug
design are often not compatible 6 8. This can prevent users connecting
to different systems. The same problems  applies with incompatibility
of power  points.
5.1.1  Conditions when technical standardisation is most important
Ensuring  technical standardisation  is likely to be most important where:
- the costs of converting from one standard to another are high - plug
adapters  are  cheap,  so  lack  of  international  standardisation in
electricity  outlets  is  annoying,  but  does  not  have  high  costs.
Electricity can be transformed  from one voltage level to another quite
cheaply, so lack of voltage standardisation  is also not overly costly.
However, transforming electricity from one frequency to another is
more costly, and therefore the gains from standardisation  are higher.
In water however, the costs of connecting systems with different
specifications  are  typically  relatively  low  so  the  gains  from
standardisation  are much less;
storage costs are high as a percentage  of value - where delays do not
matter much, for example in transporting commodities, the cost of
converting from one system to another will be lower  for example,
than in telecommunications,  where 'storing' a message until it could
be converted to a different format would destroy the ability for two
68  Negroponte  'RJ-  11'. Wired  Magazine.  Issue 6.04 April  1998.
63Section  5  Associated  systems
people  to have a  conversation  - the  essence of  a telephone  service.
In the electricity  industry, the difficult  in storing electricity  makes the
value of electricity  vary according  to the  load on the system,  and thus
increases the value of connecting  systems with different  load profiles.
Water  by  contrast  is  easily  storable,  so  the  benefits  from
interconnection,  while still positive,  are lower;
*  network  externalities  are  important  - in  some  infrastructure
industries,  the  value  of the  network  increases  with  the  number  of
people  using  the  network.  For  example,  the  first  telephone  was
worth  nothing,  since  there  was  no  one  to  call.  Once  the  second
telephone  was  made,  both  instruments  had  value,  and  their  value
increased  as more and  more people  were  added  to the  network,  and
the  number  of  people  who  could  be  called  increased.  It  has  been
argued  that  value in fact  increases exponentially  with the number  of
people  connected  to the  system.  There  are  therefore  great  gains  in
connecting  telecommunications  networks.  In  contrast,  the  value  to
one  consumer  of  piped  water  varies  very  little  with  the  number  of
other people  who also have piped  water.  Network  extemalities,  and
therefore  the value of interconnection,  are lower in water;
*  sunk costs  are  high as  a percentage  of total  costs  - if costs  are  not
sunk,  it will  be  cheaper  to  change  one  part  of a  system  to make  it
compatible  with  other  parts.  An  airline  wishing  to  standardise  on
Airbuses  to reduce  its  inventory  costs can  easily  sell  its Boeings  at
full  value.  In  contrast,  a  railway  would  have  to  write-off  a
considerable  portion  of its existing investment  in changing  from one
gauge to another; and
*  technological  change is slow - this  is similar  to the  sunk costs issue.
Where technological  change  is rapid, the  need to upgrade  will often
create  an  opportunity  to  standardise  across  a  previously  diverse
system.  It may also imply that new ways to translate  easily  between
standards are more likely be developed.
Table 5-1 below lists the industries  in which these factors are likely to be important.
_  h  _
Factors that  High storage  High costs of  High network  High sunk  Slow change




Relevance  to  Telecoms  Electricity  Telecoms  Waste-water  W  ater
industries  (in  Electricity  Telecoms  Transport  Water  Waste-water
decreasing  order to  Transport  Gas  Electricity  Gas  Gas
- importancee  ;- 
Gas  Transport  Gas  Transport  Electricity
Waste-water  Waste-water  Waste-water  (rail)  Transport
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5.1.2  Market  solutions
Market  solutions are  possible, and  can in  fact be  seen as a  driving  force for
innovation.
As suggested by the analogy  of the battle of the sexes  the outcome can be improved if
co-ordination between industry participants is possible. In the case of technology
standardisation  it is in the interests of all industry participants to commit to a certain
standard. This could be done, for example  through a voluntary association  responsible
for setting pipe diameters,  and  junction protocols in the water industry.
Market solutions can however  cause problems.  For example:
*  a technically superior standard may  loose to  an inferior standard.
Some commentators have alleged that this was the case in the battle
between IBM compatible PCs and the Apple Macintosh, or in the
battle  between  the  VHS  and  Betamax  standards  for  video
recorders. 6 9
*  there may be considerable delays in establishing a  standard. This
could result in a costly game of chicken as described in Section4.1.2,
and leave some consumers with incompatible equipment.  The time
taken to establish a standard for 56kbps modems may be an example
of this; and
*  different standards may become entrenched in different areas, for
example US and UK television formats.
The potential costs associated with market solutions  has led to calls for Government
intervention to establish open, industry wide standards.  However, this can also be
extremely costly. 70 Unless carefully designed, technology standards can grant a
competitive advantage to certain companies within the sector, become a barrier to
entry and stifle innovation.
5.1.3  Policy implications
It  appears  unlikely  that  there  would  be  significant  gains  from  enforcing
standardisation in  the  water  industry,  primarily  because  of  the  low  costs  of
converting.  However further technical work is required to  tell where the issues
identified in Section 5.1.1 combine to support government intervention in standard
setting, in particular in electricity.
Government interventions  could include actions such as:
69  Kay, John, 1993,  pp. 107-109.
70  For a sceptical view of network externalities, see Liebowitz, S.J & Margolis, S.E (1994)
Network Externality: An Uncommon  Tragedy  Journal of Economic Perspectives  Vol. 8, No. 2,
Spring 1994  p. 133-150.
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*  mandating electricity frequency;  and
allowing industry to  engage in  co-operative standard setting, for
example by making it clear that this is permnitted  under competition
(anti-trust) laws.
5.2  Implications of free entry for economic regulation
This section focuses on regulation of the tariffs and service standards of infrastructure
providers  when  free  entry  is  allowed.  Regulation  designed  to  promote
interconnection was dealt with in  Section 5.1.  Health, safety and  environmental
regulation were discussed in Section  4.5.
In this  section we first discuss briefly the general rationale for regulation.  Then
against this background, we analyse whether companies which enter an industry in
response  to liberalisation should be regulated.
5.2.1  Summary of rationale for utility regulation
Regulation is generally thought to increase efficiency. This view is usually based on
the simple model of a monopolist producing  a single good and selling it at one price
to all who wish to buy it.  This model, which many people learnt in school or first
year university, shows that a profit maximising monopolist will restrict output and
raise price above socially optimal levels.
More realistic models of infrastructure monopoly providers show that their profit
maximising strategy will differ from that assumed by the simple model, and will
entail lower efficiency losses.  However, they will continue to make high profits.
From this perspective, regulation may best be understood not as a  mechanism to
enhance efficiency, but as primarily concerned with achieving a socially acceptable
distribution of income between producers and consumers of infrastructure services.
On this view, the emphasis  on efficiency  in regulation  is justified, but this emphasis is
seen  as  being  concerned with  minimising efficiency  loses  which  result  from
redistribution through regulation.
As Brooke Cowen and Cowen (1998) shows, unregulated providers of infrastructure
services will  often be efficient even  if they  are natural monopolies7 l This  is
because:
*  unregulated providers have the maximum incentive for productive
efficiency; and
*  unregulated providers are likely to charge tariffs which  are more
allocatively efficient than tariffs set by regulators.  If an unregulated
monopoly provider had  perfect  information, its  pricing  strategy
would be  to  set tariffs which  maximise total  surplus, and  then
71  Brook  Cowen,  Penelope  and  Cowen,  Tyler,  Unregulated  Privatization for  Natural
Monopolies,  Forthcoming  in the Cato Journal.
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appropriate the surplus through a fixed charge exactly equal to each
consumer's surplus.  In reality, infrastructure providers will not be
able to price-discriminate so perfectly. However they will generally
have better information than a regulator, and stronger incentives to
price in a way which maximises overall  surplus.
In developing countries the efficiency  arguments against regulation of infrastructure
are bolstered by the fact that:
*  regulatory capacity is low, so regulation  is likely to be poor; and
*  the most common problem for utilities in developing countries is that
they  make  inadequate  profits,  and  therefore  cannot  finance
investment. This means that regulation, which usually aims to limit
monopoly profits, is a solution to a problem which does not exist in
most developing  countries.
Nevertheless, most  countries regulate infrastructure providers.  This  is probably
because people resent paying well above cost for very important or essential services.
Politicians can tap this resentment by limiting prices, thus transferring rents from the
provider to the consumer. This is often politically beneficial, since in many cases the
provider has few votes, and consumers  have many.
Arguably the history of electricity provision in the  United States illustrates this
process. Initially, power was supplied  by private, unregulated companies. Increasing
scale economies, and popular dissatisfaction with the prices and profits  of these
companies, led politicians to experiment with various ways of controlling utility
prices,  culminating  in  the  current  mix  of  Federal  and  State  level  regulatory
commissions.
7 2
Private investors welcome regulation  in some cases.  This is likely to be because  they
are aware of the political temptation  to expropriate  their profits after investments  have
been sunk.  They believe that setting up in advance rules to determine the allocation
of surplus reduces the risk of ad hoc expropriation.
In summary, it is generally most efficient not to regulate infrastructure,  but political
pressure to redistribute rents from producers to consumers means that most countries
do regulate. Investors may welcome  this because it provides certainty.
5.2.2  Economic Regulation of New Entrants
Bearing  in mind the  rationale for regulation in general, this  section focuses on
whether competitive entrants to an industry  should be regulated.
In this  discussion we  assume that the incumbent is regulated initially73 If the
incumbent were not regulated, there  would probably be little reason to  regulate
72  Jacobson  & Tarr (1996).
73  By regulation we mean any kind of Government-imposed  restriction on its freedom to set
prices.
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entrants. We have seen that efficiency is likely to be enhanced  by not regulating, and
if the political dynamic has not led to regulation of a monopoly incumbent, it is
unlikely to lead to regulation  of a new entrant.
If entry is sufficient  to provide  real competition in a market segment, then there is no
need to regulate either the incumbent or the entrant. In the UK telecommunications
sector for example, following privatisation in 1984, all of British Telecom's (BT)
services were subject  to a price cap. As competitive  entry has occurred, regulation has
decreased so that price regulations are only enforced over two specific aspects of
BT's services. 74
Often, however, the entrant and the incumbent will each enjoy some market power.
For example:
*  where the entrant serves a previously  unserved area, there will be no
competition. Each provider will have a local monopoly;
*  where  the  entrant  supplies an  area  previously  served  by  the
incumbent there will often be switching costs, limiting customers'
ability to change between suppliers,  and thus giving each supplier the
ability to charge above cost; and
*  even when switching costs are low, if there  are only one or two
entrants  in  an  area, it  is  likely that  the  market  will  reach  an
equilibrium price which is above cost.
In all these situations, it is likely to be efficient to refrain from regulating  the entrant.
An unregulated entrant will have maximum incentives for productive efficiency.  If
the entrant is a local monopolist, it will have incentives to price in an allocatively
efficient way.  If the entrant faces some degree of competition from the regulated
incumbent, its pricing will  be constrained by the  incumbent's prices.  It  seems
unlikely that this would lead it to charge prices which were less  allocatively efficient
than the incumbent's, although  this possibility  would be worth researching further.
Most  importantly,  developing  countries  suffer  from  lack  of  investment  in
infrastructure.  Regulating entrants is likely to reduce the profitability of entry, and
therefore reduce investment.
Consider examples such as supplying sanitation services in an Indian slum, providing
high quality water to an industrial estate in Trinidad, or establishing an internet
service provider in Uganda. Each of these business  ventures could be profitable. But
each is highiy risky, and could well fail.  Taking into account the risk of failure, an
investor would only invest if he believed there was also a chance of high profits.
However a regulator will only see the businesses which succeed.  After the business
has succeeded, the risks will be smaller, and so the reasonable level of profits will
seem lower. Knowing  that a business will be regulated therefore cuts off much of the
74  The price regulations  that remain are that all tariffs must be geographically uniform, and that
the bills of the lowest 80% of residential customers must fall by 4.5% in real terms per year.
While 80% appears high the spending patterns are very skewed so that  the top  20% of
residential customers contribute a disproportionately  large amount  of revenue.
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upside  potential  of an investment,  while  leaving the  investor with the  downside  risk.
Table 5-1 provides  a numerical  illustration  of this problem
Tabe  5M:  Ecnoki:c  Reg'aii  Deer;..  .
Expected return
Scenarios  Likelihood  of  Unregulated  Regulated
each scenario
Failure  33%  0%  0%
~~~~~~~~.  .. .....  ...  . ........  ............  . ......  .....  .........  ..  ...  .....  ... ....  ...............  .....  ........  .. .....  ...  . . . ....  .. !......  ..................  ....  ................  ...... 
Moderate  success  33%  12%  12%
. . . ........  ...  ...  ....  . . . ...  ...........  ...  ....  ..........  . ...  ....  .. ............  .. ..--. ....... ...  ......  ...  ......  ......  ..... -..  . .. ... .....  ...  .. ....  ...  ....  ..........  ..........  .... .. . ....  .. 
Best case  33%  36%  16%
Results
Expected return  16%  9.33%
Investors'  cost of capital  16%  16%
Investment  decision  Invest  Do not invest
This table  shows  a hypothetical  infrastructure  investment.  There  are three  possible
outcomes  of the  investment:  failure, moderate  success, and best case.  Each outcome
is equally  likely.  There  are two possible  policy  settings:  unregulated  or  regulated.
Under  the  regulated  scenario, the  provider  will  not be  allowed  to earn  a  return  in
excess of its cost of capital, which is assumed to be  16%.
The  two  right-hand  columns  show  the  returns  the  investor  expects  under  each
scenario.  For  the  failure  and  moderate  success  scenarios,  the  returns  are  the  same
regardless  of whether the business  is regulated.  This is because the  returns are below
the  investor's  cost  of capital,  so the  regulator  would  not intervene.  Under  the  best
case  scenario,  the  unregulated  profit  would  be  36%.  However  in  the  regulated
scenario, this would be limited  to 16%.
In  making  the  investment  decision,  the  investor  calculates  the  expected  return,  and
compares  it to his cost of capital.  If the investor believes he will not be regulated, the
expected return will be  16%, equal to the cost of capital, and the  investor will invest.
If the investor  believes he will be regulated,  the expected return drops to under  10%,
and investor will not invest.
Note  this  problem  will  be  most  severe  where  the  prospective  entrant  is  a  single
project  company.  If the  entrant has multiple  projects  in one regulatory  jurisdiction,
an  arrangement  could  be  worked  out in which  the  entrant was regulated  to earn  its
cost  of capital  across a portfolio  of  projects,  some of which  would  fail  and some  of
which  would  succeed.  Pharmaceutical  companies  in the  UK  are  regulated  on this
basis,  in the  sense that  they  are allowed to earn  a normal  rate of return  across their
entire research  and development  portfolio.
There  are  three  arguments  in  favour  of  regulating  entrants  which  should  be
considered:
achieving  social and political  objectives;
*  encouraging  investment by providing certainty; and
69Section 5  Associated systems
providing equality of treatment between companies in  the  same
industry.
Governments are  often  interested  in  redistributing rents  from  producers  to
consumers,  even when this is not welfare maximising overall. This is particularly so
when the producer is foreign owned. In this case, the rent distribution increases total
national welfare even as it reduces global welfare.  Where the Government has this
objective, and where it is likely that entry will be highly profitable (and that entrants
will be foreign owned), the Government  may further its objectives by regulating the
entrant.
Such cases are likely to be rare, however,  as few free-entry infrastructure investments
in developing countries will be so clearly profitable that regulation would not risk
deterring entry.  Where an entrant's  investment is not clearly highly profitable,
regulation may deter entry, as illustrated in Table 5-1.  In this case, regulation may
well reduce welfare for national consumers.
Investors know that if they are successful, there will be pressure to regulate them.
For example, someone supplying electricity to an area for the first time may initially
be able to charge a high price, as residents are grateful simply to get power.  In time,
however, residents will become accustomed to having electricity, and will start to
compare the price with  costs, and with prices in  other areas.  This will create
dissatisfaction and lead to calls to regulate the local electricity company.  In some
cases  investors might  prefer  to  reduce this  risk  by  establishing a  regulatory
framework in advance.
Our  judgement  is  that  providing  entrants  with  certainty  will  seldom  justify
Government taking the initiative in regulating entrants.  If investors want regulatory
certainty, they will generally  be able to suggest  a suitable regime to the Government.
It may be seen as unfair to regulate the incumbent and not to regulate the entrant.
Fairness  between people  is  generally  a  policy objective, but  fairness between
companies is seldom an objective in itself. Fair treatment of companies may be good
practice, largely because it provides  certainty and may provide competitive neutrality,
thus promoting  investment and efficiency.
In the case of free entry, the rationale for equal treatment of companies is greatly
reduced.  The incumbent, by assumption,  has a near-monopoly position. Regulating
the  entrant  in  these  circumstances will  tend  to  deter  entry,  and  thus  reduce
competition, investment and  efficiency.  The  benefits  of  fairness  will  seldom
outweigh  these costs.
There are several countries which regulate the incumbent more closely than they
regulate  entrants.  For  example, Telecom New  Zealand  is  subject  to  specific
obligations with respect to local service and information disclosure.  None of the
other five telecommunications providers operating in New Zealand are subject to
these obligations. Approaches  similar  to that adopted for telecommunications  in New
Zealand will generally be best practice.
In conclusion, it will generally be best practice not to impose economic regulation on
new entrants. Exceptions  to this are:
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*  where  it  is  clear  that  entry  will  be  highly  profitable,  and  the
Government  values  consumer  welfare  more  highly  than  producer
welfare;
*  where  it is  clear  that  entry  will  be  highly  profitable,  and  that  the
entrant will be foreign owned; and
*  where the entrant itself requests regulation.
5.3  Politics of monopoly and free entry
We have seen that:
*  free entry will often be welfare  enhancing; but
*  most countries restrict entry.
The cause  of  this puzzling  result can be found in part in the political  dynamic  which
supports restrictions  on entry.  In the following  sections we examine;
*  the politics which  create and sustain limitations  on entry; and
e  the political  implications  for areformist  government  of allowing  free
entry.
5.3.1  Political dynamic of restrictions on entry
The politics  of monopoly  breaks into two parts:
*  why are monopolies  created; and
*  once created, why do they persist.
Creation of legal monopolies
In  some  cases  the  genesis  of  legal  monopolies  in developing  countries  lies  in the
uncritical  adoption of foreign ideas and models.  For example:
Trinidad,  like  many  other  former  British  colonies,  took  English
utility  law  as  the  basis  for  its  own  post-colonial  laws.  Since  the
English law restricted  entry, the Trinidadian  law also restricted  entry;
*  in the  1970s,  many  people  believed  that  the  water  sector  was best
structured  into regional,  vertically  integrated  monopolies  with  both
service  provision  and  resource  management  responsibilities.  The
previously  diverse  UK  water  industry  was  restructured  along  these
lines  in  1973.  Many  countries,  including  India  and  Brazil,
restructured  their industry in accordance  with what was then  regarded
as best international  practice;  similarly
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former French colonies naturally looked to France as a model for
their own utility sectors.  Consequently,  many countries established
national electricity  monopolies patterned  on Electricite de France.
Socialist and nationalist ideology played an important role.  In socialist countries,
policy  makers  believed  that  planned  state  ownership was  superior  to  private
ownership and markets.  Consequently, competitive entry was prohibited in most
sectors, including  infrastructure.
Some post-colonial countries were anxious to establish economic as well as legal
independence.  This was  often interpreted to  mean national  ownership of  key
economic sectors, including infrastructure.  As  a result, infrastructure was often
nationalised, or remained in government  ownership  after independence.
In these circumstances, free entry would have meant allowing competition with the
government, which could be seen as harmful.  It might also have meant allowing
entry  by  foreigners  in  cases  where the  local private  sector  was  insufficiently
developed to finance and manage infrastructure  projects. Again, this would have run
counter to economic nationalist objectives.
There are cases in which short term or narrowly political objectives led Governments
to grant monopolies which were contrary to the interests of the country over the
longer term.  In Jamaica, foreign exchange  crises in the late 1980s and early 1990s
led Governments to sell successive tranches of shares in Telecommunications of
Jamaica (ToJ) to Cable and Wireless.  The perceived riskiness of Jamaica as an
investment destination, coupled with the  urgency of the Government's need  for
foreign  exchange, allowed  Cable and  Wireless to  demand extensive  monopoly
powers. While the privatisation of ToJ brought initial gains in increased investments
and improved quality of service, Jamaica's performance in telecommunications is
now lagging again, and it is widely believed within the country that the monopoly
privileges granted were too extensive  and long-lived.
There may also be cases in which personal gain motivated grants of exclusivity.
These tend not be documented. A possible example was the planned privatisation of
the  Argentine post office.  A  former Economy Minister, Mr Domingo Calvino,
alleged that a bill to privatise the post office (which was unanimously approved by
the Senate) was tailor made to give a postal monopoly to a  politically connected
businessman. 75
Political dynamic  sustaining monopolies
Legal monopolies are sustained by a variety of factors.  We have seen that in some
cases exclusivity will be justified by public policy objectives such as universal service
and environmental protection.  Even where these objectives could be better served
through other mechanisms, it is perhaps not surprising that the economic theory of the
1940s  to 1970s,  which tended to emphasise economies  of scale and a positive role for
the State, continues to hold sway in many countries, both developed and developing.
In other cases, the persistence of exclusivity may be nothing more than inertia; there
75  The Economist,  May 30 - June 5th, p.35.
72Section 5  Associated systems
may have been no call to revisit the assumptions which prevailed when the current
laws were established.
In searching for  an economic explanation for the persistence of monopolies in a
variety of situations, including  those in which exclusivity reduces overall welfare, a
possible candidate presents itself in public choice theory.
Public choice theory (at least as expounded by economists  such as Demsetz, Posner,
Niskanen, Buchanen and  Sowell) starts with Schumpeter's postulation that  rent
seeking is the primary objective of economic activity. 76 It applies this postulation  to
Government decisions, seeking to explain policy-making in terms of the individual
interests of officials, politicians,  voters and others involved in policy decisions.
In the remainder of this section we use the tools of public choice theory to develop a
possible explanation for the sustainability  of restrictions on free entry.  We provide
empirical examples to  demonstrate the plausibility of the theory.  However, the
emphasis on self-seeking behaviour which emerges is in part a  reflection of the
theoretical tool chosen.  We do not mean to  imply that this is only cause. Other
factors, including both idealism and inertia are also important.
A public choice theory explanation  of restrictions on entry starts with the observation
that most monopolies generate rents, that is, returns in excess of those required to
cover costs and remunerate investment.  To the extent that the rents  are due  to
government  action, government  may be able to influence  distribution of the rent. The
rent can then be distributed  to political or personal advantage. For example:
*  in  France,  holders  of  concessions  for  municipal  services  are
sometimes alleged to pay off mayors or municipal officials, either
directly in cash (a number of cases have come to court recently), or
through political contributions, overseas trips, use of apartments in
Paris, etc.;
*  in several countries privatised utilities are an important source of
campaign contributions;  and
*  it has been argued that one of the reasons for the nationalisation of
the  French electricity industry in  1946 was to  end the undue and
corrupting influence  of utility owners in politics?7
In the above cases, rents are generated by natural monopoly factors, as well as by
legal restrictions on  entry.  Government control over the  rents often flows from
ownership and other sources of influence as much as from control over entry.  The
various factors are generally impossible  to isolate. Nevertheless, it could be assumed
that:
76  Schumpeter, J.A. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, (1943), Unwin; and The Theory of
Economic  Development,  Oxford University  Press. (1961).
77  Jacobson, Charles D.  and Tarr, Joel A.  in Infrastructure  Delivery: Private Initiative and the
Public Good, IBRD (1996) pg.28, referencing Frost, R. L, Altemating Currents: Nationalised
Power in France, 1946-1970,  Ithaca, Comell University  Press. 1991.
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*  restrictions on entry generally allow additional rents to be generated;
*  these rents will be partly under government  control; and
*  governments  could benefit from control of these rents.
This can be so even when the entry restrictions reduce welfare overall. The reason is
that  the  losers  from  the  restrictions tend  to  be  dispersed, while  winners  are
concentrated.
For example, political patronage can be  used to award party supporters jobs  or
contracts with monopoly utilities. 78 For the individual benefiting from patronage,
the rewards  are substantial.  The inefficiency which results  from such political
appointment is eventually recovered in higher tariffs.  However, because the tariff
increase is spread across many customers, the cost to each one is small.  Therefore it
is not in any customer's individual interest to oppose the system, since the costs of
lobbying for change would be high, while their personal benefit  would be small.
There are also cases in which losers are more concentrated  than winners, but the rent
redistribution still makes political sense. For example, a populist Government might
conclude that business people will support the opposition in any event.  Therefore it
will not lose any support by increasing utility rates to businesses. The revenue which
this creates can then be used to subsidise rates to groups whose support might be
swung toward  the populist party.
It  is also important to  consider the dynamic within governments concerning rent
distribution. If one treated the government  as a single entity, one might conclude  that
the tax system would be the most effective way to collect and distribute rents.  One
would therefore question why the government  would use less efficient systems, such
as infrastructure licences. However,  in many countries  the tax system is controlled by
the Minister of Finance.  Other ministers may want their own source of funds and
power.  Therefore the  minister in charge of an infrastructure area may  have an
incentive to create and maintain exclusive arrangements,  even if this is not the most
efficient way to  generate rents from the  point of view of the government as a
whole. 7 9
Perceptions and  information costs  have  similar effects.  The citizens  in  many
countries are alert to  the  risk that  governments may  reduce overall welfare  by
redistributing rents for personal or narrowly political objectives. Citizens often resist
these tendencies. Popular action is much more likely against a few gross or obvious
abuses than against a myriad of small and complex schemes.  For example, citizens
are usually strongly opposed to tax increases.  The cost imposed on  citizens by
inefficient infrastructure is usually much harder to see, and therefore inspires less
opposition. In some cases this may provide an additional reason for governments to
maintain restrictions on entry in infrastructure.
78  McCarthy (1994), Kerf & Smith (1996) Box 1.4 citing ESMAP (1993).
79  For a game-theoretic  view of this dynamic, see Mauro (1995)  p.705-706.
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The factors which tend to promote political support for inefficient restrictions on
entry  also  support  government action  to  redistribute rents  through many other
mechanisms, including trade barriers, licensing in other industries, and  industrial
subsidies.  Governments interested in reducing the effect of these factors therefore
should consider both general and infrastructure  specific solutions.
Various countries have introduced legal and constitutional  measures designed at least
in part to limit such rent redistribution. Trinidad, for example, will soon pass a new
law governing utilities.  It is likely that this will allow for the award of exclusive
licences, but only where the Minister of Public Utilities certifies that this is necessary
to  achieve the objectives of the Act.  Other countries require that all regulatory
restrictions on business are subjected to a cost-benefit analysis before being passed.
Competition law  limiting  the  creation of  monopolies could also  help  in  some
circumstances.
Conclusions  on  the  Political  Aspects  of  Creating  and  Maintaining
Limitations  on Entry
In conclusion:
*  governments often restrict entry in infrastructure even when welfare
would be increased  by allowing  entry;
=  a range of factors explain initial restrictions  on entry. Beside genuine
attempts at good public policy, these include uncritical acceptance of
external influences, and socialist or economic nationalist ideologies.
In some cases, the restriction results from politicians or officials
seeking personal gain or short term political objectives; and
*  a similar range of factors explains the persistence of restrictions on
entry.  Public choice theory emphasises that restrictions on  entry
contribute to the stream of rents under government control.  Even
though such rents are inefficient, it is seldom in anyone's individual
interest to change the system. This is because the losers from the
system are dispersed, or politically unimportant.  The winners from
the system are sufficiently concentrated and politically important to
maintain  the system  which benefits them. A political dynamic against
free entry may be created.
This view of the political dynamic of restricted entry in infrastructure is analogous  to
public  choice  theories  explaining  other  restrictions  on  competition,  such  as
protectionism, and targeted industrial  subsidies.
5.3.2  Political Implications  of Allowing Free Entry
This  section  examines  whether allowing  free  entry  would  assist  a  reforming
government  which is interested  in increasing  welfare overall.
Increasing welfare would  include unravelling the rent redistribution mechanisms
referred to in the previous section. For example, a reforming minister might want to:
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*  remove cross-subsidies  in tariffs;
*  reduce government  subsidy  of utilities; and
*  reduce staff at an inefficient government-owned  utility.
These reforms will be politically difficult precisely because they run counter to the
political dynamic supporting rent redistribution. The losers from the reforms will
often be more concentrated  and politically influential  than those who gain from it.
For example, reducing staff in a utility will be strongly opposed by workers at the
utility.  The winners will be consumers, who will face lower bills in the future.
However, the change in the utility bill is likely to be small and uncertain (since it is
spread over a wide group), so few consumers will provide political support for the
reform.  Politically, there  would be  little  to  counter-balance the  opposition of
workers.
In most countries, ministers could not avoid taking some responsibility for the losers
in the  system.  However, the  extent to  which the minister is blamed may  vary
according to whether the losses are the result of direct ministerial action, or the result
of decisions  taken by independent  parties acting at one remove from the minister.
For example, the minister may face a choice between:
- reforming a state electricity utility directly;  or
e  allowing free entry in generation and distribution of electricity, and
allowing  market pressures  to take their course.
Assume the minister chooses the free entry approach. If the incumbent is inefficient,
with a distorted tariff structure, cherry-picking  entry to supply major industrial load
centres is likely.  As the incumbent loses industrial  market share, it will be forced to
drop industrial tariffs toward cost.  Tariffs previously kept below cost through a
cross-subsidy from industrial users will have to rise if financial viability is to  be
preserved.  Shrinking revenues drive managers to cut costs by reducing staff.  In the
longer term, as fully commercial  electricity entities become established and accepted,
the legitimacy of continued government subsidy to the former monopolist could be
eroded.
In  this  scenario, the  minister achieves all  the  reform objectives with  only one
decision; allowing free entry.  Unpopular decisions to raise residential tariffs and
reduce staff are taken by others, in response to independent, external competitive
pressure. This could insulate the minister from the unpopularity  of reform, while still
allowing him to take credit for the vibrant, efficient and competitive electricity sector
which will result.
Less fortunate outcomes are also possible.  In some countries the minister would be
not only blamed for the increase in domestic tariffs, which consumers will know he
could have prevented, but also condemned  for allowing foreign capitalists to exploit
and recolonise the country through their cherry-picking behaviour.  The incumbent
utility would refuse to raise other tariffs or reduce labour, and instead would incur
ever larger operating losses, which central government  would have to fund.
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These scenarios show that the usefulness of free entry in reforming a utility sector
will be highly situation specific. In general, free entry will be most politically useful
as a driver of reform where:
*  there is a good prospect of competitive  entry;
*  competition is generally considered  by the public or opinion formers
to be desirable;
*  there is acceptance  of private ownership  of important industries;  and
*  incumbent utilities are relatively autonomous  and commercial.
Where few of these conditions hold, more hands-on reform will be required.  Free
entry could then be allowed toward the end of the reform process, after tariffs have
been  rebalanced, and  the  autonomy and  commercial focus  of  existing  utilities
increased.
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6  Likely significance of allowing free entry
In this section we briefly describe the kinds of changes that could be expected from
allowing  free entry in a sector in which it was previously forbidden
The effect of allowing  free entry depends in large part on the situation at the time free
entry is allowed. Where an existing monopoly provider is working well and meeting
consumer demands at cost reflective tariffs, allowing free entry will have little or no
immediate effect.  Allowing free entry will have longer term benefits, however.  It
will  provide a  modicum of competitive pressure on  the  incumbent to  maintain
performance, and allow consumers an alternative in the event that performnance  does
deteriorate.  Perhaps most importantly, it ensures that if the incumbent does not take
advantage of major technological changes in the future, entrants will be able to bring
those innovations  to the market.
Where an incumbent monopoly works well, but cross-subsidises  some consumers  and
charges others above cost, 'cherry-picking' entry is likely.  Cherry picking has been
observed in the UK water market, and in international  telephony in many countries.
Entrants may or may not be more efficient  than the incumbent. The likely effect is to
force tariff  re-balancing.  This increases allocative efficiency. It  may undermine
social objectives, requiring the  introduction of competitively neutral alternatives.
Once tariffs are brought into line with the costs, the situation will be that of a well
functioning  monopoly charging  cost-reflective  prices.
Utilities which perform well are rare in developing  countries, so it is most interesting
to consider what happens when there is an inefficient incumbent failing to meet
market demands, and free entry is allowed. While a wide variety of responses could
be expected, some examples will give a flavour.
In Nigeria, Lee and Anas (1992) found that as a result of the unreliability of the
monopoly provider (NEPA), 86% percent of all manufacturing  firms own some form
of generating capacity. The great majority of firms use NEPA as the primary source
of power, but maintain sufficient back-up to power  their entire operation in the event
of a power failure.  As a result, the private generating capacity has a load factor of
only around 25%.
The authors surmise that were firms allowed to sell power to each other, they would
respond in two ways:
*  joint production  - in which a large firm with existing facilities could
arrange to supply neighbouring  firms with back-up capacity; and
*  'shared  production'  in  which  firms  club  together  to  form  an
infrastructure pool - perhaps a separate firm or co-operative, owned
by the firms to be supplied, which will supply all firms in the club
with infrastructure  services.
The scope for economies of scale and increased load factors (effectively reduced
reserve plant  margins) mean that  such arrangements could cut the  total cost  of
electricity supply to firms significantly.
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Similar responses could be expected in Uganda, for domestic as well as commercial
and  industrial customers. In Uganda self-generation of electricity is widespread.
Many firms have standby petrol or diesel generators because of the unreliability of
grid supply. These firms' generators  seem to work for around 4-6 hours on average
per day, which suggests a high level of un-utilised  capacity. 80 Allowing  free entry in
Uganda  for  on-selling  electricity would  probably result  initially  in  neighbours
supplying power to  each other.  This could develop into club  and co-operative
arrangements,  and eventually  to the point that private companies set up specialising  in
the supply of electricity to areas currently  unserved  or poorly served.
In sanitation, Lee and Anas (1992) cite the private effluent collection and treatment
facility on the Agbara Industrial Estate in Nigeria as an example of a utility pool.
This facility was established by the private developer of the estate, and is operated  by
a management company.  Similar arrangements can be envisaged in other industrial
areas as environmental  standards  are tightened.
Many developing countries in the  Caribbean and elsewhere depend on  tourism.
Where resorts line a beach, the costs of pollution can be largely internalised by a club
of resorts in the area. Currently many hotels rely on package plants, which are non-
core business, do not benefit from economies  of scale, and often malfunction. If free
entry were the norm, it is possible that resorts would club together to establish a
single large sewage treatment plant, the management of which could be contracted
out to a specialised private operator.  In this case, it is probable that resorts would
allow businesses and household in the area to connect to the system. A similar logic
drove the establishment of a private water company supplying desalinated water to
hotels and other customers  in the Cayman  Islands.
Free entry may also improve residential sanitation services in developing countries.
The examples of the Orangi Pilot project and its replication in Lahore show that poor
people in urban areas value sanitation highly, and are willing and able to pay for it,
provided appropriate low cost technologies  are used.  However such willingness to
pay  extends only  to  removal of waste  from the  area.  Additional Govemment
intervention (such as providing for interconnection  with an existing sewerage system)
will be necessary  to ensure proper treatment and disposal.
In water, the initial effects of free entry in many places will be to legalise current non-
piped suppliers such as water carriers, water truckers, and people who sell to their
neighbours.  This may have beneficial effects of increasing certainty in the industry,
allowing greater investment,  and reducing  the scope for racketeering.
One could expect that the next development  could be for some people to specialise in
on-selling piped water, initially through establishing private water vending kiosks.
Low  cost  extensions of piped  supplies into unserved areas  could  be  the  next
development. Already squatter and slum settlements in many places are served with
low-cost plastic piped networks taking water illegally from the mains. Legalising on-
selling would provide the potential for people who are legally connected to establish
80  Ugandan Ministry of Natural Resources Energy Department,  Report on Rural Electrif oation
Prepared by Commissioner  for Energy  Ministry of Natural Resources  (1997).
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similar low cost extensions to the network. The water company would benefit from
the extra sales, and the greater security of a legal operation could, in time, lead to
investment in higher quality piping, meters, etc. in the  network serving the  low
income area.
Where water resources are available in the vicinity, entrants are likely to source water
as well as distribute it.  A small scale example is provided by the private vending of
water treated by low cost UV disinfection  in Manila, Philippines. 81 The aguateros of
Paraguay show that such entry can be  large scale,  when the legal and physical
environment permits.  Aguateros operate wells to extract groundwater, may have as
many as 800 customers, and lay substantial piped networks.  Even in Paraguay, the
legal environment for aguateros is uncertain. If free entry was unambiguously legal,
it is likely that access to  capital would be easier, and larger and more efficient
networks could be constructed.
81  Solo & Snell (1998).
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In conclusion,  there should be a strong and general  presumption  in favour of allowing
free entry in water and electricity  industries.  Where efficient  incumbents  supply most
of the population  at cost-reflective  prices,  allowing  free entry will not often result  in
entry.  This follows  from the natural monopoly  characteristics  of water and electricity
supply.  Even in these cases, allowing  free entry will seldom cause harm,  and may do
some good by pressuring the incumbent to remain efficient.
It  is  common  in  developing  countries  for  the  incumbent  utility  to  be  inefficient,
provide  a  poor  service  to  only  a  fraction  of  its  potential  customers,  and  to  charge
prices which  bear  little relation to costs.  In these cases, the benefits of free entry can
be  considerable.  Industries  will  benefit  if  high  quality,  reliable  service  can  be
provided  by new  entrants.  Slums, rural  areas and urban  peripheries,  which  are  not
served  by the  incumbent,  will be  legally  able to  seek alternative  sources  of  supply.
There are  numerous  examples  of communities  and businesses  having  benefited  from
entry in these circumstances.
Free entry will also allow technological  progress.  The nature of technological  change
is  that  it is  unpredictable.  This  makes  it  dangerous  to  limit  entry  in  water  and
electricity  just  because  it seems  unfeasible  currently.  Future  developments  in fuel-
cells,  small-scale  desalination,  or other technologies  as yet  undreamed  of may  make
these industries  far more competitive  in the future.  The telecommunications  industry
shows  the  revolution  which  a  combination  of technological  change  and  competition
can bring to an industry once regarded as a natural monopoly.
In all these respects,  water  and electricity  are little different  from  other sectors of the
economy,  in which  free entry is the norm, and competition encouraged.
There  are cases in which  free entry will cause  problems.  Sometimes  these problems
will be so severe as to outweigh  the positive  effects, and  may provide  a rationale  for
restricted  entry.  The circumstances  in which free entry might reasonably  be restricted
are summarised  in Table 7-1
In  reviewing  Table  7-1 it must  be  borne  in mind that  its  purpose  is to  show those
cases  in which  the  general  presumption  in favour  of  free entry may  not  apply.  It
shows  cases  in which  allowing  free entry might  be  harmful.  In  all cases,  the harm
from  allowing  free  entry  must  be  weighed  against  the  damage  which  government
imposed  limitations  on entry can do to efficiency,  dynamism and transparency.
While  govemments  will generally  want to review each of the various  factors  listed in
Table  7-1  in making  decisions  on  whether  to  restrict  entry,  there  is an  additional
argument  in favour  of simply  allowing  entry in all or almost all cases.  This has to do
with the costs of complex  government decision  making.
As shown  in Figure 3-1 earlier in the paper, policy conclusions  may vary according  to
the  administrative  capacity  of  the  government,  and  according  to  the  nature  of  the
problems  faced.
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Restricting entry places increased  pressure on government or a regulator to address
complex questions. As the regulatory decisions  required become more complex, costs
rise as a result of:
*  increased costs of analysis and decision making within government,
as each situation  must be analysed  afresh;
*  increased costs on  the  private  sector, as a  result of  delays and
uncertainty;  and
*  increased losses from lobbying, corruption and  other rent-seeking
behaviour, as people try to manipulate the decision-making process
to their own ends.
These costs will typically be greatest for countries with the  least administrative
capacity.  It  will often be the case that the  costs of complex and discretionary
decision-making outweigh the  benefits  of  tailoring decisions precisely  to  each
situation. In such cases simple rules - pure free entry or pure exclusivity - are best.
Of the two, free entry will generally  be the better rule.
Therefore, in the water and electricity sector of countries with limited governance
capacity, a simple rule allowing  free entry will often be the best policy.
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".  . ,,  *  .
Administrative  Capacity  Very low  Moderate  Good
Issue
.......  ......  ................  ............  . ..  ...............  .............-  . ...  ...............  .....  ...  ..  . .......  ................-  ...........  ..........  .. ..  . ...  ...  . . ..  . .............  - .....  .......  ..........  . ..  .............  . ......................... i ..
Inefficient  entry and duplication  Allow free entry, since government  Where there is an incumbent  with  Where there is an incumbent  with
Free entry could increase  total  capacity  will be insufficient  to  significant  sunk costs, allow free  significant sunk costs, allow free
production  costs, as several firms  identify and solve such problems.  entiy, and allow incumbent to set  entry, and allow incumbent  to set
production  costs, as several firms  X  i  racefo the  ame  maket  (hicke  prices as it wishes,  prices as it wishes.
race for the same market  (chicken  1 
problem), or an entrant supplies  ,  Where there is no incumbent,  and  Where there is no incumbent,  and the
only a subset of outputs  with strong  the costs to entrants  of establishing  costs to entrants of establishing  long
economies  of scale  (13,  2/3  long  term contracts  prior to  term contracts prior to investing are
problem), or two providers target  investing  are high, consider  high, consider organising a
the same  market niche, leaving  1  organising a competition  for the  competition  for the market.
others poorly served.  ii  market.i
others poorly  served,  market  Period of exclusive  franchise award
1  Period of exclusive  franchise award  jshould  generally be limited to the
should  generally be limited  to the  period necessary for the entrant to
period necessary  for the entrant  to  become established,  e.g. 5-7 years.
become established,  e.g. 5-7 years.
Universal  service  Allow free entry.  May be an argument  for providing  Allow free entry.
a policy  of  Wherecapacityislow,anyscheme  exclusivity in exchange  for
Free entry may unravel a policy of  Where  capacity is low, any scheme  o  Meet service objectives  through
cross-subsidising  services to some  designed  to promote universal  However, this is only sustainable if  competitively  neutral mechanisms
groups by charging  other groups  service is likely to fail. Better to  the monopolist  meets universal  such as vouchers,  or industry-wide
above cost.  allow the market to respond to  service tgets  In many countries  social obligation  funds.
!  consumers'  needs.  ,the monopolist fails to serve target
1  groups, and free entry would be
better.
.......................  ........  ..... ..  .. ......  . . ...... . ..  . . . .. . ...,  . . . .. ..  . . .,, ..  ... . . . .. . . ...  . . . . . . . .
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Administrative  Capacity  Very low  Moderateod
Issue
...  ...........................................  ......  ......  ......  .....  ....  ...........  ........  .....  .........  ...  ..  . ...................................................................................................................................... 
Exclusivity  and private sector  1 Countries  with low capacity will  Requests  for exclusivity  should  Countries should try to avoid giving
participation  often be regarded as high risk. In  generally  be resisted. In some  exclusivity.
addition, mechanisms  to hedge risk  cases,  the benefits of granting  i
Free entry  may decrease  private  , may be hard to obtain,  a  exclusivity  will outweigh the costs  E  be merog  bout risk can
sector  willingness  to invest.  often be met through competitively
Private investors  may demand  i but exclusivity  should be for a  neutral mechanisms,  such as more
exclusivity,  ~~~~limited  period if possible. { exclusivity.  j hmitedperiodifpossible.  ' sophisticated  regulatory formulae.
There will often be a net gain from  Transitional periods of exclusivity
granting exclusivity  in these  ! will be justified in some cases, for
circumstances. However, this  example to allow tariffs to be
should if possible  be limited to the  . rebalanced and efficiency increased.
period the operator  requires to
establish itself-  perhaps 5-7 years.
................  .............  ...........-  ..............  ....  ............................  .........  ............  ......  .............  ...........................................  ................................................  . ....................  ..................................................................................  .. ..  .. ..  ...  .................... .. ...  ..  . .. ..  .. . ..
Time-tabling  and routing  Not a problem in water - allow free  Not a problem in water - allow free  Not a problem in water - allow free
problems  entry.  entry.  entry.
In an integrated  electricity  system,  i In electricity,  allow free entry,  In electricity, allow free entry,  Allow free entry, subject to the
some central mechanism  may be  subject  to the provisions  designed  to  subject to the provisions  designed  to  provisions  designed  to promote
needed to ensure efficient  promote future  interconnectability,  promote future interconnectability,  future interconnectability,  outlined
despatch.  outlined  below.  outlined  below.  j below.
Environmental  and Safety  Where  there is no ability  to enforce  Can provide a rationale for  Allow free entry.
standards.  environmental  and safety standards  restricting  entry. Need to bear in  E
* !  . . ',  . ,  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Establish  and enforce general,
generally allowing  free entry will  Xmind  that: 
Competitive  pressure sharpens  genel  allowing  freantry will  i  t  competitively  neutral environmental not make things significantly  worse.
companies' incentives  to cut  provided  personal liability  and safety regulation.
corners with safety and the  Where  there is some ability to  law functions,  this will
environment.  enforce standards,  and safety or  often address safety
.,,,  . ..........................  ..  ..........  ................... I..............................  ...  . .....  ........  . . . . .........  .......  .. ..... .. .. .. .. .. .. ..  ............................................
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Administrative  Capacity  Very low  Moderate  Good
Issue
At the same  time, fragmentation  of  environmental  issues are of great  concerns. May require
the industry makes  enforcement  importance, consider  restricting  operators  to carry  third
more difficult.  entry.  party insurance.
Environmental concerns  in
electricity can often be
addressed  just as well when
there are multiple operators.
Likely scale of entrants
reduces grounds for
restricting  entry.
*  potential over-abstraction  of
aquifers or pollution of
aquatic environments
provides rationale for
restricting  entry in water and
sanitation.
.. ............  ...  .....  ...................  ....  . ..  . ....  ..................  . ......  .......  ....  ...  .............  ....  ....................  ........  .....  .........  ..................  .................... 1.  .....................  . . ......  ..........  ..........  . ..  . ........  .....  . ...  . ........  ....  .. ..........
Inter-connectability  and  Allow free entry.  Allow free entry.  iAllow free entry.
technical standards  i If regulatory capacity is sufficient,  Consider encouraging  or requiring  Consider encouraging or requiring  all
Free entry  may result in isolated  consider encouraging  or requiring  !  all entrants to adopt the same basic  entrants to adopt the same  basic
systems  developing  along their  compliance  with basic standards  in  m  standard in some areas, e.g.  standard in some areas, e.g. electrical
own lines.  electricity,  such as frequency.  electrical  frequency.  frequency.
It is likely that, in the future,  Allow industry standard  setting  and  | Allow industry  standard  setting and  Allow industry standard setting and
interconnection  would increase  co-ordination.  co-ordination.  co-ordination.
efficiency. However, incompatible
technical standards  may make this
costly or impossible.
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Administrative  Capacity I  Very low  Moderate  Good
Issue
Economic regulation  Do not regulate entrants  unless they  If entrant likely  to remain small  If entrant likely to remain small
request it.  compared to a regulated incumbent, ! compared to a regulated incumbent,
or if market  is becoming  or if market is becoming increasingly
i increasingly  competitive,  do not  competitive,  do not regulate.
iregulate.
in cregulases  o  In cases of significant  entry into  a
| In cases of significant entry into  a  new area which is likely to remain a
new area which is likely  to remain a  monopoly, consider  regulation
monopoly, consider  regulation  I through franchise-bidding.
through franchise-bidding.
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